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Introduction
Borders  are,  as  Étienne  Balibar  (2002:79)  puts  it,  'world-configuring'.  They  squeeze  our 
thinking and feeling about the world into different categories. Territorial borders in particular 
squeeze our thinking into territorial states. There is nothing 'natural' or 'given' about them, the 
messy reality is impossible to neatly order into states, and maintaining an illusion of borders 
requires constant effort. Think of the lines signifying the borders on a world map, they are 
imposed on top of what is already there, as lines cutting through the land, the people, the 
rivers, the mountains, the fields. They could always be elsewhere, or not at all. Birds do not  
care about the borders, nor does the water or the wind. Borders materially shape the world and 
people's lives, they shape how we think and understand the world, others and ourselves, and 
they create affect: how we, perhaps unconsciously, feel about ourselves and others, and for 
whom we feel responsible. However, they are also impossible, a dystopian/utopian project. 
They never manage to completely contain people, thoughts or affects.
Here I am going to focus on only one aspect of borders, a very material and often 
violent practice: the regulation of migration. I approach this not from the perspective of the 
state – which often sees migration as a problem and as something in need of regulation – nor 
of the bird – for whom the border is irrelevant – but from the perspective of people migrating 
and crossing borders without authorisation and permission of the states in question. From the 
perspective of people living in a place where they do not have permission to be, from those 
who are in constant risk of deportation, and who perhaps are deported. From here, it is not  
migration but  the border that is  the problem. From here,  the border is  not  irrelevant,  not 
something we can just disregard, it shapes and conditions one's life in a very material and 
direct way. It is constantly there. At work, at the hospital, at school, in public spaces, at home.
My  interest  in  studying  borders  and  regulated  migration  is  motivated  by  my 
engagement with different groups that work politically against the regulation of migration and 
that support undocumented migrants. I have been involved in providing legal counselling and 
support for migrants, in providing practical support such as finding housing, money, and food, 
helped in contact with authorities and schools, and in more public activities such as organising 
seminars and lectures. Many of the undocumented migrants that I know or have met come 
from war-torn countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, but whose asylum claims are 
rejected for example with the argument that there are some parts of their country of origin that 
are safe, so they could supposedly use the 'internal flight alternative'. Many asylum-claims are 
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not tried because they are so called 'Dublin-cases'.1 Many are unaccompanied minors, who do 
not know if their families are still alive or where they might be, but whose age is not believed,  
or who are not believed when they say that they have no one to take care of them if they are 
deported. Many are families where one or some of the family members have got residence 
permits but not the others, either because of idiosyncratic bureaucratic rules or because they 
are  not  recognised  as  family.  Many  are  LGBTIQ-people  who  are  denied  asylum  either 
because they are not believed, or because it is deemed safe in their country of origin, even in 
countries where homosexuality is illegal or where homophobia is well-documented. Many are 
women whose political work is  not recognised,  or whose stories are not seen as signs of 
persecution  because  of  the  gendered  form that  persecution  has  taken,  and  some  are  not 
believed as 'credible' because they have not behaved as it is thought that women from this or 
that 'culture'  do. Many have lived in Sweden for years. And some are seen as having no 
legitimate reasons what-so-ever to be in Sweden: no grounds for asylum, no work, no spouse, 
no children. These are the reasons that are 'valid', that is, unless you come from a state whose 
citizens need no particular 'reasons' to live here, for example EU-citizens.
Through these engagements I have come to see something of how borders and the 
state may appear from the perspective of unauthorised migrants: as brutal forces of extreme 
violence with complete disregard for people's lives, as powers that reach into every corner of 
one's  life,  thoughts  and  feelings.  Being  engaged  in  this  practical  and  political  work,  we 
discuss, have different ideas about, and struggle to find useful and effective strategies and 
arguments against borders, or against the regulation of migration. That is what this thesis is 
about:  what  would  be  strong  and  effective  arguments  and  strategies  against  borders  and 
regulated migration? I  aim to make this exploration useful  both in practical  work against 
regulated migration and in providing some directions for future feminist theoretical work on 
borders  and regulated migration.  A further aim is,  concurrently,  to  explore some ways in 
which feminist theory can contribute to research on borders and regulated migration and to 
arguments against them. I am particularly curious as to how feminist affect theory could be 
useful  for  this  inquiry.  In  this  thesis,  however,  I  will  only  use  some specific  points  and 
arguments from affect theory, as an initial exploration of what it could mean to study borders 
1 The Dublin convention stipulates that it is the EU-country through which the asylum-seeker entered the EU 
that should try their application for asylum. This is usually verified by checking if their finger prints have 
been taken by some other country or if they entered the EU with a visa issued by another country. If an 
asylum-seeker, in for example Sweden, who gets a Dublin-decision avoids being transferred for 18 months,  
then they can have their asylum-application tried in, in this example, Sweden.
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and regulated migration with this approach.
Feminism is about equality and solidarity, and it must always take the side of the most  
precarious lives. What makes this a feminist project is not my object of study but the above 
foundation and my use of feminist theory. Feminist theory, further, is not always explicitly 
about gender, it may be about other power relations, or it may not deal explicitly with any 
particular power relation, but be theory sprung out of feminist research and feminist concerns, 
theory that is much more widely applicable than its original object of study.
Based on the inability of the state to properly recognise people's needs and/or desires 
to migrate, I take it as my starting point that regulated migration must be abolished. Thus, I do 
not  focus  on  whether there are  good arguments  against  regulated  migration,  but  on what 
arguments are good arguments. We need to think beyond borders, to denaturalise borders, to 
constantly keep in mind that they need not be. Taking them for granted or seeing them as 
necessary without properly questioning them is an example of methodological nationalism, 
'the naturalisation of the nation-state by social sciences', which has shaped much scholarship 
on migration (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002:576).
In  the  practical  work  against  regulated  migration  and  in  support  of  individual 
migrants,  we  ask  the  following  questions  about  arguments  and  strategies:  how  do  we 
reconcile  migrants'  urgent  need  for  residence  permits,  and  equal  rights  to  health  care, 
education, social welfare, with more radical hopes for a different system in which migration 
status does not matter? How can we argue for this or that person's – or group's – right to stay, 
or need to stay, without implicitly arguing that others have less right or need to stay? Is there 
any point in trying to make the asylum system better when the state will never be sufficiently 
good at recognising people's needs? (How) can we work towards improving the existing laws 
or the current practices without reproducing the state's legitimacy to decide over migration?
This is where I turn to theory. In order to navigate these questions one needs to more 
thoroughly understand what borders and regulated migration are, or better put, what they do. 
They have to be put in a larger context, as being a constitutive part of the organisation of our 
social and political life into nation-states, and as connected to various axes of power that 
structure political and social relations. In order to do this I will analyse and discuss what I 
have grouped into five  different  approaches or types of  arguments against  borders,  either 
borders  in  general,  or  specifically  regulated  migration.  The  first  is  Giorgio  Agamben's 
philosophical critique of how sovereignty always produces bare life, or homo sacer. Refugees 
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and unauthorised migrants have been seen as contemporary examples of homo sacer, both by 
Agamben himself and by others drawing on his work. Secondly, I analyse arguments against 
borders that seek to rethink, deconstruct or expand citizenship as a theoretical and practical 
strategy to counter the exclusions of borders. The third approach is Nicholas De Genova's 
marxist  argument that the primary function of the state and of borders is  to regulate  and 
discipline  labour  in  order  to  facilitate  capital  accumulation,  and  that  'deportability',  a 
consequence  of  insecure  migration  status,  is  a  key  tool  in  creating  exploitable  labour. 
Fourthly, I look at arguments against borders that take the perspectives of indigenous peoples 
seriously. I focus in particular on the work of Harsha Walia who is active in migrant justice 
and indigenous movements and who combines the anti-capitalist critique of borders with a 
critique of borders as racialising practices. Lastly, I discuss Bridget Anderson's critique of 
migration  control  which  focuses  on  how borders,  entangled  with  other  power  structures, 
produce subjects (migrants and citizens alike) as well as social and political relations of which 
everyone is part. Thus, migration controls shape social and political life at large, it is not only 
a concern for migrants.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In the next section I map out how my study is situated 
in relation to previous feminist research on borders. After that I briefly present the theoretical 
and methodological approaches I use in this thesis. Thereafter I present the five approaches or 
types of arguments against regulated migration on which I have chosen to focus. In the main 
body of the thesis I read each of these five approaches through different feminist theoretical 
frameworks and interventions and through my own experiences of the practical work against 
regulated migration. In the concluding section I wrap up and try to provide some answers to 
the questions I posed at the outset.
Before proceeding, however, I will briefly clarify my usage of some key terms. There are 
many different terms used to discuss what are called 'illegal migrants'. Labelling migrants 
'illegal' is, however, criticised for several reasons. Firstly, it disguises the fact that it is not 
persons  who  inherently  are  illegal,  but  that  it  is  the  state  that  makes  their  presence  or 
movement illegal. A better term would thus be 'illegalised'. Secondly, it is avoided as part of a 
rejection of the state's right to decide on migration. Thirdly, the distinction between legal and 
illegal is often unclear and permeable. People often move in and out of legality and illegality, 
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many are in  conditions  of  'semi-legality'  (Anderson 2013;  Rytter  2012),  and some of  the 
problems facing 'illegal' migrants are the same for those with 'legal' status, particularly those 
whose  legality  is  temporary,  that  is,  who  have  temporary  permits.  The  permeability  and 
instability of these distinctions apply to all the following terms as well.
A second  commonly  used  phrase  is  'irregular  migrants'  (and  the  concurrent  term 
'regularisation' meaning moving from a state of unauthorised or 'illegal' presence, to legal and 
documented presence). However, because of the sheer numbers of people crossing borders in 
an 'irregular' manner, one might question whether this is really not one of the 'regular' ways of 
migrating, and often it is the only alternative (for example for asylum-seekers that are not 
among  the  few  who  are  selected  by  the  UNHCR  to  be  relocated).  Perhaps  it  is  called 
'irregular' because of the racialisation of those who travel in this way.
A further commonly used term is 'undocumented migrants' (sans-papier in French or 
papperslös in Swedish). It is, however, a bit misleading. Undocumented migrants often have a 
lot of documents2, for example a passport, but just not those documents that are required by 
the state where they live. Neither are they undocumented in the sense that they are entirely 
unknown or unidentifiable. Another problematic aspect of this term is that it risks portraying 
people as always or inherently 'paperless', as a constant lack, when in reality they become so 
only in specific situations when their papers are 'wrong'. It also obscures the fact that it is the 
state that makes them 'undocumented'.
Other terms are 'without (legal) status' or 'precarious (legal) status' (Villegas 2015), as 
well  as  'clandestine  migrants'  (Sager  2011).  The  term  that  I  have  chosen  to  use  most  
extensively is,  however,  'unauthorised migrants'  (Harrison & Lloyd 2012:374;  Chauvin & 
Garcés-Mascareñas 2012; Basok et al. 2014). The benefits of this term are that it highlights 
the  state's  agency  in  deeming  people  'unauthorised'  and  that  it  avoids  the  language  of 
'illegality'.
Occasionally, I find it more appropriate to speak of unauthorised  residents  (I could 
also have used the terms non-citizens or denizens) (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012) 
rather than 'migrants'. I use 'migrants' when speaking about the actual journey of crossing 
borders or of newly arrived people, but for people who live permanently in a place and have 
done so for years, perhaps generations, 'residents' sometimes seems more appropriate.
2 To the legal counselling that I have been involved in, it often happens that people bring several binders of 
documents, documents from years of struggle with the migration authorities, and documents from their 
countries of origin proving their persecution, but which, in the language of the migration authorities, are 
deemed documents of 'low quality'.
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However, as will be noted, I use several of these terms, partly in order to adhere to the 
vocabulary used by the authors I am discussing, and partly because one term or the other may 
be more appropriate, depending on the context. Nevertheless, when I use for example the term 
'illegal'  migrants/migration,  with or without  quotation marks, I  ask the reader to keep the 
above clarification in mind. Further, when I speak about migrants or migration, this includes 
'unauthorised'  migrants  and  migration.  I  only  spell  out  'unauthorised'  when  it  makes  a 
difference.
Furthermore,  the  label  'unauthorised'  migrants/migration  comprise  any  number  of 
different people and positions along the lines of class, race, gender, sexuality, nationality, age, 
ability, etc., and any number of reasons for migrating. Also, the unauthorised migrants that I 
know or meet are extremely diverse in these terms; it is impossible to describe them as a 
group. The only thing they have in common is their lack of full legal status, which causes 
them a lot of problems and suffering. 
One more clarification of terms is necessary: sometimes I use 'borders' and 'regulated 
migration' interchangeably, sometimes I specify that I mean both, and sometimes I speak only 
of that aspect of borders that is regulated migration. I hope that the reader will understand 
what I mean in each context. If not, perhaps the ambiguity is significant: while I focus on 
regulated migration and take as my starting point that this system must be abolished, I leave 
the question about borders in their wider sense more open, and leave it to the reader and to 
future research to decide whether the arguments against regulated migration should also be 
arguments against borders in the general sense.
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Previous research
Within feminism, postcolonial, black, xicana and third world feminists have studied borders 
and migration most extensively. In Borderlands/La Frontera (2007), Gloria Anzaldúa shows 
how  borders  are  imposed  on  top  of  people,  communities  and  land.  She  discusses  the 
psychological  and  affective  consequences  of  living  in  the  borderlands.  Chandra  Talpade 
Mohanty (2003), in Feminism Without Borders, argues against bordered thinking in feminist 
theory,  and in  favour  of  a  decolonisation  of  theory.  She also  argues  that  feminism must 
practice solidarity across borders and that struggles across locales must be connected. Sara 
Ahmed (2007) does not focus explicitly on borders but shows how – for instance – migration 
control can be used as a stopping device that obstructs some bodies' movement through space 
and facilitates that of others. This exposes some of the norms of the nation, since those not in 
line with norms are noticed, stand out as non-belonging, and consequently encounter more 
resistance. All of this challenges the assumption of territory-language-ethnicity-nation-race-
citizenship-belonging-home-community being tied to each other, and shows that these are not 
necessarily connected, and that the border is arbitrary (see also Wimmer & Glick Schiller 
(2002:309)  for a  critique of the assumption of congruence between citizenry,  sovereignty, 
solidarity and nation). This work is important because it challenges the naturalness of borders, 
by challenging their affective and discursive power and by showing their connections to other 
power structures. However, they do not pay very much attention to the aspect of borders that 
is regulated migration. Starting from the position – as I do here – of one of the groups that are  
most directly, materially and violently affected by borders, unauthorised migrants, shows that 
feminist theory cannot stop at theoretically criticising or overcoming the border, or at making 
practices and theory that disregard the border (there is a difference between practices that are 
'without' or 'against' borders). Rather, as the plight of unauthorised migrants shows, we must 
directly confront the border, both in theory and in practice, and more specifically, we must 
directly  confront  –  and  theorise  –  the  very  material  aspect  of  borders  that  is  regulated 
migration.
Nira  Yuval-Davis  (1997),  among  others,  have  further  worked  on  some  aspects  of 
borders through her attention to the nation, and particularly the centrality of gender in the 
construction of the nation. Another approach to the nation and nationalism is Jasbir K. Puar's 
(2007 & 2013) work on homonationalism, which is the combination of homonormativity and 
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nationalism, when nationalism takes the form of homonormativity, and when the nation is 
constructed as tolerant, homonormative, civilised and modern, in contrast to others that are 
consequently  constructed  as  sexually  deviant,  perverse,  backwards,  intolerant,  etc.  In  my 
analysis  I  will  draw  on  Puar's  arguments  about  the  connection  between  nationalism, 
racialisation and sexuality to demonstrate their importance in making good arguments against 
borders.  This  is  especially  relevant  because  the  five  approaches  that  I  analyse  do  not 
sufficiently account for sexuality within their arguments. Neither Yuval-Davis nor Puar work 
explicitly on borders, however, at least not regulated migration, and thus I have the same 
points of critique here as above.
Another stream of feminist studies that is concerned with borders includes the scholars 
that work on peace and transversal politics. Cynthia Cockburn (2004 & 2014) has studied how 
women across borders collaborate in their struggle against partition, conflict and inequality. In 
doing so they enact what Cockburn and Yuval-Davis, among others, call 'transversal politics', 
'a practice of creatively crossing (and re-drawing) the borders that mark significant politicized 
differences' (Cockburn 2014:436), and which thus is a way of challenging the significance of 
borders  when  it  comes  to  solidarity,  identification,  collaboration  and  shared  political 
struggles.
Feminist  criticism of theories of citizenship is also relevant. These theories are for 
instance concerned with the 'masculine'  norm for citizenship;  production and conscription 
taking priority over reproduction; the division between public and private; and the legal sense 
of  citizenship  taking  priority  over  the  active  doing  of  citizenship.  Examples  of  feminist 
critical  engagement  with citizenship can be found in texts  by Mary G. Dietz (1998),  Iris 
Marion Young (1998), Ruth Lister (2003), Maja Sager (2011) and Lauren Berlant (1997). 
With the exception of Sager, however, their work does not primarily question citizenship from 
the perspective of migration or unauthorised migrants/residents, which I aim to do, in order to 
more decisively move away from an already given national/state frame.
Furthermore, feminists have also studied borders and/or migration in relation to global 
capitalism, particularly how capitalism creates increasingly precarious living conditions, and 
low  wage  and  dangerous  employment  in  the  Global  South  as  corporations  move  their 
production from the North to the South, and how women are particularly affected by this. One 
focus has been on maquiladoras, the offshoring of production into free trade zones (see for 
example  Mohanty  2003;  Jaggar  2001).  This  phenomenon  has  received  attention  largely 
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because women working in these industries have themselves struggled against the situation. 
There is also a large body of work on the feminisation of migration in the form of women 
migrating to do domestic work elsewhere, taking care of other people's children while leaving 
their own at home (see for example Lutz 2008). Anderson's (2013) work – which is one of the 
five approaches that I focus on – could be said to have emerged from this field of research; 
particularly by studying migrant domestic workers and au pairs, she shows how migration 
controls are gendered and gendering practices.
Feminists have directly engaged with borders and the regulation of migration – and 
consequently the illegalisation of migrants – by demonstrating that the UN convention, which 
forms the  basis  of  asylum laws,  constructs  the  refugee  according to  certain  male,  liberal 
norms of who is politically active and what it means to be persecuted. 'The refugee' was/is  
imagined as a liberal man, politically engaged in clearly recognisable ways, such as being 
publicly outspoken and active in party politics, who is persecuted by a totalitarian communist 
state (Anderson 2013:55-6; Lewis 2013:177-8). Very few of today's asylum-seekers fit this 
figure and this idea of persecution (although some of course do). Rather, people flee wars, 
conflicts,  heteropatriarchy, poverty and a lack of possibilities to imagine a liveable future 
(reasons that are often entangled, but whose separation is crucial for the migration system). 
Moreover, political acts, as well as persecution, may take forms that the migration authorities 
fail/refuse to recognise. Feminists – and others – have criticised the inability of the refugee 
system and asylum-process to recognise gendered and sexualised forms of persecution, the 
ways in which gender identity and sexuality can be bases of persecution, and the narrative 
requirements of the asylum-interview (Lewis 2013; Fobear 2014). This points to the limits of 
seeking recognition by the state and of state regulation of migration in general. It also points 
to how the regulation of migration, and in particular the asylum system, may serve wider 
nationalist projects of the state. I will return to all of these points.
There is also research on the connections between sexuality and (illegal) migration 
(see for example Luibhéid 2005; Lewis 2013). For my purposes, the most relevant aspect of 
this field of study is the way in which sexuality is entangled with gender, class, race, nation, 
etc., how all of these in turn are not just regulated and targeted but also produced through 
borders, and how borders do their work – for example that of differentiating between 'us' and 
'them' – through sexuality.
To sum up, there is a wide range of feminist work that is relevant for the study of 
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borders and regulated migration. Some of it is explicitly engaged with borders or with the 
regulation of migration whereas other contributions only indirectly discuss borders through 
their focus on adjacent concepts or processes, such as the nation or citizenship. Boundaries – 
of which borders are one form – are, however, a central focus for feminism (for example 
boundaries between genders). Feminism has shown that boundaries are complex, changeable, 
arbitrary  and  sometimes  it  challenges  them altogether.  Thus,  (nation/state)  borders  would 
seem a very relevant focus for feminism even if  it has not so far been a primary area of 
concern. While there has been a lot of feminist theorising about borders, there has been much 
less that specifically focuses on that aspect of borders that is regulated migration. Borders are 
criticised on a more abstract level and theory and practice are urged to disregard borders, to 
disengage and disentangle from them, to not let borders determine how we think and act.  
However, if we start from the position of unauthorised migrants – in various contexts and who 
have become 'unauthorised' for a variety of reasons – then it becomes apparent that borders 
cannot  just  be  disregarded  or  criticised  in  the  abstract,  rather,  we  must  engage with  the 
material practice of regulated migration, theorise this particular border-practice, explore it, 
argue against it and act against it. Of those feminists that study the regulation of migration, 
and who point towards the need for a more thorough critique, there are even fewer who take it 
a  step  further  and  embark  on  this  project,  for  example,  by  theorising  what  borders  and 
regulated migration (as a whole, not just one aspect of them) really are and what they do, and 
who put  it  in  a  larger context  and challenge it  on a  more systematic  level.  For instance, 
sometimes feminist critique of the asylum-system (for example that by Lewis 2013) argues 
for the need to improve it, to make it more sensitive to issues of gender and sexuality, but 
without connecting asylum to other forms of migration, to the regulation of migration as part 
of capitalism, or to nation-building and nationalism. Some of the exceptions are Anderson, as 
already mentioned, and Melissa Autumn White (2014) who argues for a queer politics of no 
borders. Thus, there is a need for more feminist work on this particular aspect of borders: 
regulated  migration.  I  seek  to  contribute  to  this  by  taking work  from other  fields  –  that 
perhaps have little grounding in feminism – and examine which aspects of these approaches 
and arguments that could most fruitfully, from a feminist perspective, be developed further.
My aim is  not  to  come up  with  strategies  that  always  work.  That  is  impossible,  
because arguments will always have to change according to time and place. Nevertheless, I 
try to sketch out some key points that arguments and strategies need to include in order to be 
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useful  in  the  practical  struggle  against  regulated  migration,  and which  can provide  some 
directions for further research. 
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Theoretical and methodological approaches
As already mentioned, my aim with this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is to find good arguments 
and strategies against regulated migration, and secondly, it is to explore some ways in which 
feminist  theory can be  useful  in  making good arguments  and strategies  against  regulated 
migration, both in order to make a case for the need of feminist theory in this kind of project,  
and to chart out some possible directions for further research within feminism.
The methodological inspiration for this thesis comes from Alecia Y. Jackson and Lisa 
A. Mazzei. In their book Thinking with Theory in Qualitative Research (2012), they 'plug in' 
the same material into numerous different theoretical concepts and frameworks. 'Plugging in' 
can be explained as making the material and the theory (or different materials or different 
theories) speak to each other. 'Plugging-in', they argue, should be seen as a process rather than 
a concept (Jackson & Mazzei 2012:1-14). This way of thinking about analysis also makes 
room for the recognition of the 'agential intra-action' (Barad 2003) of the material, the theory 
and the researcher plugging them into each other, acknowledging that all exert  a form of 
agency in  this  intra-action.  Something happens when 'reading-the-data-while-thinking-the-
theory' (Jackson & Mazzei 2012:4), and and also when reading-the-theory-while-thinking-the-
data; the theory changes, the material changes, and the researcher changes too. This can also 
be explained with the concept 'diffraction' (elaborated by Karen Barad). Diffraction occurs 
when 'waves pass through an opening or obstruction and are spread differently than they 
would be otherwise' (Jackson & Mazzei 2012:114). That is, something happens to the material  
when read through theory, and different things happen when read through different theories. 
Thus, by plugging the same material into various different theories, different things emerge. 
This is a way of opening up analysis to unexpected things, and to open up several paths of 
inquiry rather than being confined to only one path of analysis from the beginning, through 
the  choice  of  one  theoretical  framework.  Thus,  I  have chosen to  use  multiple  theoretical 
frameworks and concepts in my analysis of the five approaches that I am focusing on. I do a 
kind of prismatic reading of each approach; as light goes through a prism it is dispersed, it  
takes several directions and angles, more things come to light, and different colours appear.
In the prism, it could thus be said that I plug in my material (which in this case also  
consists of theories) into different feminist theories, or I read it while thinking other theories. I 
also, however, read it with my practical experiences of working against regulated migration in 
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mind, and I plug it in to the problems and situations of some of the unauthorised migrants that 
I know.
I do not read all of my five approaches through the same theories. Depending on the 
approach in question,  I  plug it  into those  theories where  it  seems possible that  a  fruitful 
conversation/intervention/intra-action could take place. Since there are different strengths and 
drawbacks with my five different approaches, they need different things. Here I will only very 
briefly present those theoretical approaches that I use more consistently throughout, they will 
be explained more thoroughly when I use them. I will also use other theories and concepts, 
some of which were presented in the section on previous research.
I draw extensively on Berlant's (2006 & in Seitz 2013) work on affect and attachment.  
She views objects as clusters of patternings and promises, and argues that it is our relation and 
attachments to objects – rather than the object itself – that matter and that say something 
about what objects do. I also use Barad's (2003) material feminist critique of objects, that 
objects should be seen as phenomena in intra-action rather than as 'things'. It is by drawing on 
the work by Berlant, and also that by Puar, that I attempt to explore some ways in which 
affect theory could be used to study borders and regulated migration.
Focusing on how subjects and relations are produced – rather than taking for granted 
categories and identities and studying how they are differently affected by various practices or 
structures  – is  a  feminist  perspective that  I  use  throughout.  This approach was (perhaps) 
initiated by Michel Foucault (1998 & 1980) with his view on power as productive, but has 
since been further developed in feminist theory. Judith Butler (2010) argues that gender is 
produced through the heterosexual matrix, through discourse and performativity. Puar argues 
that we must question how subjects are produced, and that the production of the subject is  
always already normative (Puar 2012:16),  a questioning that may be pursued by studying 
assemblages, since, as she claims, 'assemblages are interesting because they de-privilege the 
human body as a  discrete organic thing', or as Barad (referred to in Puar 2012:10) puts it, 
'matter is not a “thing” but a doing'. Boundaries, between for example different categories and 
identities,  or between human/non-human, are constantly produced,  stabilized,  destabilized. 
Similarly, Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (2008) argue that material feminism sees nature 
not as given, but as an agential (drawing on Barad 2003) part  of practices, processes and 
becomings. Focusing on processes, practices and how subjects, categories, differentiations, 
relations are produced is important because it opens up the possibility that things could be 
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otherwise, and it opens up strategies to make them otherwise.
Another theoretical perspective that runs through the whole analysis (as well as the 
methodological design), is the argument that knowledge is situated. Donna Haraway (1988) 
argues that you always perceive the world from a situated vantage point and through the aid 
of different instruments, such as the human eye, which can see some things but not others. 
Further,  drawing  on  marxism  and  stand-point  theory,  she  argues  that  those  affected  or 
subordinated  by  a  system  often  have  an  epistemologically  favourable  position  for 
apprehending  the  extent  and  complexities  of  this  subjection.  The  significance  of  this  is 
apparent when it comes to studying borders and regulated migration. From the perspective of 
the state or of some citizens, migration might be seen as a 'problem' to be dealt with and as 
something that has to be controlled and regulated, and borders might be seen as necessary in 
order to create order through classification and delineation,  to make the state appear as a 
'thing' and to manage its relations to other states. From the perspective of migrants, however, 
particularly unauthorised migrants who cross borders illegally, who stay without permission, 
or who are deported, it becomes much more apparent that it is the regulation of migration that 
is the problem. The argument that knowledge is situated is one of the reasons why, throughout 
my analysis, I try to look at the arguments from the perspective of those most badly affected 
by the regulation of migration, and to consider what arguments and strategies that work for 
them. I do not myself have that experience, and cannot claim to speak for those who have. 
Nevertheless, by listening to what different people with these experiences say and by thinking 
about problems and perspectives of people I know or have met who have experience of living 
or moving without authorisation, I try to consider what things would look like from those 
positions.
Another  central  and  recurring  theoretical  intervention  is  intersectionality,  which  is 
used to analyse how various power structures are connected and intra-act. There is, however, 
much debate about how this inter- or intra-action between structures should be understood and 
conceptualised (Crenshaw 1998; Collins 2000; Davis 2008; Lykke 2010). I use Barad's (2003) 
'intra-action' rather than 'interaction', because I do not see the different power structures as 
separable, but rather, that they often are co-constitutive, and with a lot of intra-categorical 
variation. Sometimes I  also say that  they are 'entangled',  also in order to emphasise their  
inseparability and that there is no clear directionality in their intra-action. Moreover, I often 
use 'power structures' to speak of for example gender, class, race, sexuality, nationality, even 
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if 'power structure' is not a perfect term. They could be seen as practices, patterns, norms, or 
as  something  else.  At  the  very  least  it  has  to  be  recognised  that  they  are  much  more 
changeable, contradictory, fluid and unstable than the word 'structure' might convey. Puar, for 
instance, also criticises intersectionality for sometimes leading to a too static and fixed view 
on identity and as failing to question the constitution of the subject (Puar 2007:211-16 & 
2012). In my use of intersectionality, I try to always see the making of structures, categories,  
differences and identities as constant processes. I do not use intersectionality to understand 
how different individuals or groups are positioned (in a static sense) according to various 
power structures or categories. Rather, I use intersectionality in the sense of the intra-action or 
entanglement  of  various  operations  of  power,  to  explore  how subjects,  relations,  affects, 
imaginaries  and  discourses  are  produced  through  these  intra-actions/entanglements.  I  am 
looking at how borders and regulated migration can be understood as gendering, sexualising, 
racialising  practices,  and as practices that produce class,  economic  inequality,  nationality, 
nations and nationalism.
I also tentatively claim that some intersectional analyses would benefit from taking 
citizenship, migration status or migratory background into account. I leave it open, however, 
whether these could in  some way be incorporated as one of the axes/structures of power 
commonly attended to in intersectional approaches (doing so would challenge state-centric 
analysis and would denaturalise citizenship as a legitimate basis of differentiation) or whether 
it would be more appropriate to see them as one set of practices through which other power 
structures operate and are materialised.
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Material: Five approaches against borders/regulated migration
I have chosen to focus on five different approaches or types of arguments against borders and 
regulated migration. Based on the perspective that the extent and complexity of a system or 
practice of power often appear more readily from the perspective of those most badly affected 
by it, I have chosen arguments that not just discuss migration, but that specifically attend to 
the  problems  of  unauthorised  migrants.  Taking  into  account  those  for  whom  regulated 
migration really does not work, the arguments would be more likely, I thought, to question 
regulated migration in a more thorough manner. However, not all  of them are sufficiently 
grounded  in  the  practical  situation  of  unauthorised  migrants,  something  which  becomes 
apparent when considering the applicability of the arguments in practical work.
Sovereignty and homo sacer
Agamben's philosophy is a critique of the very foundations of the nation-state system and of 
sovereignty. Borders and regulated migration are not his primary concern. The reason that I 
have chosen to include Agamben and people drawing on him as one of my approaches is that 
he is widely used in critiques against borders (see for example McNevin 2013). Thus it might 
be relevant to explore whether his arguments are useful (or can be made useful) for feminist 
theoretical work on borders and in the practical struggle against regulated migration.
Sovereignty, the state of exception, the camp and homo sacer are those of Agamben's 
concepts that are most widely used when it comes to the study of borders (see for example 
Prem Kumar & Grundy-Warr 2004; Pope & Garrett 2012; Dines et al. 2015; Mountz 2011; 
Vaughan-Williams 2010). Homo sacer means 'sacred man'. It is a figure from ancient roman 
law, 'the friedlos' (fredlös in Swedish), who is banned from the politically qualified life, bios, 
to become bare life, zoe. Bios is life in a particular form, organised in politics and society, life 
in the city, whereas zoe is the mere fact of being, biological life. Homo sacer becomes so by 
being banned by the sovereign, and thus excluded from the protection that laws and practices 
otherwise bestow on members of the political community, and thus he [sic] may be killed 
without it being homicide. Some of the examples that Agamben gives of homo sacer are, apart 
from the friedlos, people who were stripped of their citizenship, put in camps and killed by 
the Nazi regime in Germany; and contemporary refugees that are detained in arrival zones 
where they have no legal form of protection, but are completely at the mercy of those around 
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them. The homo sacer may sometimes be treated well, but the crucial point is that he [sic] has 
no guarantees, that he [sic] is completely dependent on the good will of others, because no 
one would be punished for any act committed against him [sic]. Agamben further argues that 
'we are all virtually homines sacri' (1998:111), suggesting that no one's life is ultimately safe 
under the rule of sovereignty, that citizenship is not a protection since we may be stripped of 
it.
One of the important points of Agamben's critique is that he points out how vulnerable 
and precarious life is  in  systems putatively based on democracy and human rights.  Since 
sovereignty will always produce homo sacer, and since we are all at risk of becoming so, it is 
futile to found political liberties on the right of the citizen (Agamben 1998:181) (as Hannah 
Arendt (2004:376) puts it, human rights do not mean much those who do not even have the 
'right to have rights'). There is thus little point in entrusting the sovereign with the task of 
ensuring the fulfilment of political liberties.  Agamben's point  is that democracy is  just  as 
incapable of caring for zoe as totalitarianism (1998:10). The vulnerability of life in face of the 
sovereign state is relevant for feminism more broadly, and vulnerability and precarity have 
been  increasingly  debated  issues  in  gender  studies  over  the  last  decade  or  two  (see  for 
example  Butler  2004a;  Puar  et  al.  2012).  Agamben's  critique  makes  it  clear  that  the 
state/sovereign sometimes directly creates  this  vulnerability,  which provides some healthy 
scepticism of turning to the state for protection and security.
Agamben's depiction of the sovereign resonates well with the state as viewed from the 
position of unauthorised migrants. For someone who lives with the threat of deportation, the 
state appears in all its brutality and shows its most violent face. The reach of its power seems 
unlimited, it might catch you anywhere: at home, at work, in school, at the hospital, on public 
transport. It seems to be completely indifferent to your life or death. If you are caught and 
deported it does not refrain from using physical violence against you. The only thing that 
matters is that you are no longer present on its territory, and what happens after they have 
dumped you at an airport somewhere in Afganistan, Iraq, Somalia, or Kongo-Kinshasa, is 
none of their concern.
In contrast to Foucault, Agamben argues that western politics is biopolitics from the 
very  beginning  (1998:181),  because  politics  is  'giving  form  to  the  life  of  the  people' 
(1998:148),  which  means  giving  shape  to  and  deciding  on  the  limits  of  bios,  that  is, 
differentiating it from zoe. He argues that 'the original political relation is the ban' (1998:181), 
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and that sovereignty, consequently, will always produce homo sacer. Agamben, thus, attends 
primarily to the process of some being cast outside of the bios, rather than the regulatory  
technologies directed at the bios, on which Foucault (1998:136-40) focuses (see also Mbembe 
2003 in this context). Attending to those unfit for biopolitics, those who do not matter to it, so 
to  speak,  and  whose  life  and death  is  thus  completely  indifferent  to  sovereignty,  is  also 
relevant for feminist usages of biopolitics, since, in my view, feminism should always seek to 
attend to those who are most marginalised.
Rethinking and redoing citizenship
Critically  studying citizenship is  not  new in gender studies.  Feminists  have examined the 
gendered  aspects  of  citizenship,  for  instance  by  questioning  who,  at  different  times  and 
places, is legally considered a citizen and who is partially or entirely excluded (for example 
women, children, people of colour, people with cognitive disabilities); which acts are seen as 
constitutive  of  citizenship  (for  example  military  service  or  childrearing);  the  norms  that 
underpin the ideals of citizenship (for instance rationality, autonomy, self-sufficiency, holding 
property); and its association to the problematic divide between public and private (see for 
example Dietz 1998; Young 1998; Lister 2003; Sager 2011).
In  the  practical  and  theoretical  work  against  borders  and  regulated  migration, 
citizenship  is  sometimes  seen  as  an  alternative  route  to  the  undoing  of  the  exclusion  of 
borders. I choose citizenship as one of the approaches that provide arguments against borders 
because it shifts the focus from criticising exclusion (borders), to finding paths for inclusion 
(citizenship). These are of course intertwined, but focusing on citizenship has spurred a wide 
range of academic work that not only destabilises borders, citizenship and the nation-state, but 
that is also more geared towards practical strategies than many of the arguments that focus on 
borders  (see  for  example  Nyers  & Rygiel  2012;  McNevin  2011 & 2013;  Varsanyi  2006; 
Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012; Balibar 2004; Sager 2011). In this thesis, the citizenship 
approach stands out because it is not represented by one key person.
Rethinking and deconstructing citizenship shows that it is not simply a formal status 
granted by the state but that it also comprises acts such as social and political engagement, 
being part of a community, that it entails rights and duties that may also apply to people who 
are not formally citizens, that it is not enacted only on the national state level, but also more 
globally and more locally, and that the state is not the only source from which citizenship 
emanates  (McNevin  2011;  Nyers  &  Rygiel  2012;  Balibar  2004:31-50;  Varsanyi  2006). 
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Pointing out these complexities and multiple aspects of citizenship is a way of showing that 
there is indeed room for debate about who is a citizen and who is not. It points to a route of 
contestation of the right of the state to decide on migration, on who can stay, on who is a 
citizen, on who 'belongs', on who should have rights and on the limits of political community 
and responsibility.
In work against borders, there are primarily two routes through which citizenship is 
questioned or rethought. The first focuses on the doing of citizenship, in the same way as the 
feminists cited above have previously criticised citizenship. These doings and acts can include 
political mobilisations by unauthorised migrants/residents, claiming different forms of rights, 
formal status, improved working conditions, better wages, or other political causes that are 
not directly about their own situation (Balibar 2004; Sager 2011; McNevin 2011 & 2013; 
Rygiel 2011). It can also be the building of or participation in local communities (Nyers & 
Rygiel 2012). Further, doing the 'duties' of citizenship, for example contributing by working 
and paying taxes, educating oneself, participating in social and political life, and even doing 
military service3, are sometimes emphasised as bases on which one can claim entitlement to 
the  'rights'  of  citizenship  (Chauvin  &  Garcés-Mascareñas  2012:242-51).  As  Shahram 
Khosravi  (2010:99)  puts  it,  '[i]ronically,  the  undocumented  migrant  exemplifies  the 
impeccable  citizen',  by  never  breaking  any  laws,  blending  in,  working  hard  without 
objections.
The  second  main  way  of  rethinking  citizenship  in  relation  to  migration  is  by 
questioning  the  state  as  the  only  unit,  arena  or  level  of  citizenship.  Focusing  on  local 
citizenship seems to be the most promising route here (rather than, say, cosmopolitanism) 
(Varsanyi 2006:231-41). There are local forms of inclusion, rights, and/or protection against 
deportation,  where  one's  formal  exclusion  is  overlooked  or  rendered  irrelevant.  Some 
examples  are  so-called  'sanctuary  cities'  where  local  municipalities  decide  that  everyone, 
independently  of  legal  status,  should  have  access  to  the  services  and  provisions  of  the 
municipality  (Walia  2013;  Nyers  & Rygiel  2012);  local  police  districts'  decisions  not  to 
enforce migration law; rights to vote in local elections; local decisions that institutions of for 
example education or health care are open to everyone, and so forth (Varsanyi 2006:241-4).
Rethinking citizenship, as something one can do, independently of legal status, and as 
something that can be created at the local level when citizenship at the state level is more 
3 Several of these things are very difficult or impossible to do in Sweden, but possible in for example the US.
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restrictive, may provide multiple paths and practical strategies for concrete and immediate 
improvements of the life situations of unauthorised residents. Deconstructing citizenship can 
also show that the concept is not as coherent and clear-cut as it may appear,  which may, 
further, facilitate its reformulation or expansion at the level of the national state. These can be 
useful strategies in other feminist struggles, if, for instance, there is a deadlock at the national 
level in respect to recognising a third gender, it is of course already practiced independently of  
what the state says, and local municipalities or institutions could also decide to recognise it in 
their own policies and activities, even if the national state does not.
Deportability, labour and the state
De Genova's  basic  argument  is  that  the  primary  aim of  the  state  is  to  facilitate  capital 
accumulation, and that borders, citizenship and the regulation of migration are key to this. He 
argues  that  if  we  do  not  begin  'from the  epistemological  standpoint  of  the  state  and  its 
functionaries  but  rather  from  the  standpoint  of  the  elementary  freedom  of  movement  as 
something like a basic human entitlement, then […] the real problem comes into considerably 
sharper focus: the problem, clearly, is the state itself' (De Genova 2007:425). I have chosen 
the work by De Genova as one of my approaches because he provides a radical critique of 
borders and because his work has been influential in the field (see for example Basok et al.  
2014;  Dines  et  al.  2015;  Doering-White  et  al.  2014;  McNevin  2013;  Lewis  2013; 
Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2013; Rygiel 2011; White 2014).
Restricting movement prevents people from escaping their predicaments (De Genova 
2010:58) and when they nevertheless do so and migrate despite the obstacles, they are made 
vulnerable  and  thus  exploitable  through  the  threat  of  deportation,  a  condition  which  De 
Genova calls 'deportability'. The objective of the state is not, in this view, to deport as many as  
possible, because they are needed as cheap labour. Instead, the objective is to create a docile 
and  exploitable  labour  force,  disciplined  through  the  threat  of  deportation  (De  Genova 
2007:426).
De Genova sees citizenship as a particularly statist form of governance – 'citizenship 
in particular comes to entail “the primary inscription of life in the state order”' (Agamben in 
De Genova 2010:45) – of which he is very critical. Firstly, he argues that citizenship is part of 
the territorialisation  of human existence, which is a result of the 'fragmentation of laboring 
humanity' into citizen and non-citizen which underpin the exploitation of human power by the 
state,  on  behalf  of  capital  (De  Genova  2010:48).  Further,  the  fragmentation  and 
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immobilisation of humanity also has a nationalist undercurrent. He argues that struggles to 
expand citizenship for 'the enhanced “inclusion” of the “foreigners” who already reside within 
the  space  of  a  “national  community”  tend  therefore  to  merely  intensify  the  constitutive 
separation of the “aliens” on the far side of the frontier' (2010:53). 'Immigrant inclusion', he 
argues, rests on nativity as a legitimate basis on which to differentiate and prioritise people. 
Nativism, he claims, 'is best apprehended precisely as native-ism – a promotion of the priority 
of “natives”, on no other grounds than their  being such' (2010:53). Citizenship is made to 
appear as a legitimate ground on which to distinguish between people and prioritise some 
over others, dissimulating racial distinctions: 'the apparently race-neutral and presumptively 
“legitimate” politics of citizenship may serve to achieve the elision of race' (2010:55). 
Moreover, he argues that struggles for citizenship as a route to protection against bare 
life or for freedom are in vain, because attaching our transformative energies and struggles to 
citizenship would domesticate them, re-inscribe them in the state-order and would also be an 
implicit endorsement of the 'necessity' of the political state (De Genova 2007:441-2). Human 
insurgent energies, he argues, cannot use citizenship as a vehicle because they will then 'be 
contained  within  the  state,  delimited  and  further  delimitable  by  law,  and  thus  become 
advantageous for the further subjection of restless and creative human powers as alienated and 
domesticated ones'  (De Genova 2007:442).  Lastly,  citizenship is  deceptive;  it  prevents us 
from recognising our own abjection. Citizens are not safe: 'the more flagrant abjection of the 
world of denizens only shows, to the more properly domesticated citizens, the image of their 
own future' (2007:442). De Genova (2010:45) makes the point clear: '“Criticism has torn up 
the imaginary flowers from the chain,” Marx once admonished, “not so that man shall wear 
the unadorned, bleak chain but so that he will shake off the chain and pluck the living flower” 
[…] Indeed, it is  citizenship  that remains for us the imaginary and purely deceptive flower 
dissimulating our subjection and adorning our abjection'.
There are at least two ways in which De Genova's critique is relevant for feminist 
studies. First, he reminds us about the need to maintain a healthy critical distance to the state 
and  its  forms  of  governance,  of  which  citizenship  is  one.  If/when  we  seek  changes  and 
solutions through the state it is important to keep in mind that these may also serve other 
objectives of the state, such as facilitating capital  accumulation and creating a governable 
population. Secondly, the way he initiates a consideration of what borders do and what they 
produce resonates with wider feminist  interests  in studying practices rather than taken for 
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granted categories and objects, and shows that borders and regulated migration are practices 
that are indeed very interesting and relevant to study.
Indigenous perspectives and border imperialism
The next approach to borders and regulated migration that I will focus on is that stemming 
from indigenous relationships to land and the critique of borders and settler states emanating 
from indigenous resistance. I focus particularly on this critique as it appears in the work of 
Walia. Walia combines an anti-capitalist critique of borders similar to that of De Genova, with 
the  critique  from  indigenous  struggles  and  with  a  firm  grounding  in  migrant  justice 
movements,  specifically No One Is Illegal  (NOII) (Canada).  She uses the concept 'border 
imperialism', which she describes as consisting of four overlapping structures:
first, the mass displacement of impoverished and colonized communities resulting from asymmetrical 
relations  of  global  power,  and the simultaneous securitization of  the border  against  those  migrants 
whom capitalism and  empire  have  displaced;  second,  the  criminalization  of  migration  with  severe 
punishment and discipline of those deemed 'alien' or 'illegal'; third, the entrenchment of a racialized 
hierarchy of citizenship by arbitrating who legitimately constitutes the nation-state; and fourth, the state  
mediated  exploitation  of  migrant  labor,  akin  to  conditions  of  slavery  and  servitude,  by  capitalist 
interests (Walia 2013:5).
The perspective of indigenous peoples provides a radical critique of borders and the 
state,  one  that  is  based  on a  different  relationship  to  nature,  land and property,  than  the 
dominating  views  in  western  understandings.  To  make  a  very  generalising  claim,  in 
indigenous cosmologies, land is not property, and nature is not something to be exploited and 
used. Rather, human beings are inextricably part of nature, living in relation to it and to other 
animals. From these perspectives, one does not need any extensive theorising to be critical of 
borders, it becomes readily apparent that borders are imposed on top of the land and people, 
sometimes as part of a colonial project, and that the state is sometimes best apprehended as an 
illegitimate settler state. These perspectives denaturalise borders and property, and provide 
examples  of  how things could be otherwise.  Drawing on these  knowledges,  which could 
perhaps be called subaltern in Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak's words (1988), or subjugated in 
Foucault's (1980:81-3), provides a way of arguing and acting that departs from state-centric 
perspectives on migrant justice. Two examples of slogans in this vein are 'we didn't cross the 
border, the border crossed us' and 'No one is illegal, Canada is illegal' (Walia 2013:77). The 
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question about  standpoints,  perspectives  or  subordinated knowledges are  central  topics  of 
feminist  theory  (see  for  example  Haraway  1988),  and  the  standpoints/perspectives/ 
knowledges of colonised indigenous peoples need to be taken into account to a greater extent 
in  gender  studies  and feminism more  broadly.  Further,  indigenous  relationships  to  nature 
speak to  current  feminist  rethinking of materiality and the divisions between human/non-
human, nature/culture, material/discursive (Alaimo & Hekman 2008:1-7).
Walia points to similarities in the positions and oppression of unauthorised migrants 
and  of  indigenous  peoples  within  border  imperialism.  Despite  numerous  obstacles  to 
solidarity  and  coalitions,  she  argues  that  indigenous  struggles  and  struggles  for  migrant 
justice,  have to and  can work together, and that the goal of indigenous sovereignty and no 
borders  go hand in hand.  She provides numerous examples of  alliances  between the two 
groups.  For  example,  undocumented  migrants  have  participated  in  protests  to  defend 
indigenous lands, and indigenous peoples' challenges of the Canadian state's jurisdiction over 
their land have also been a challenge to its right to decide on migration. As an act of asserting 
their  own  sovereignty  over  their  land  indigenous  peoples  have  welcomed  migrants  and 
offered  protection  against  deportation.  As  Melissa  Elliot,  indigenous  activist,  says  'the 
Canadian  government  has  no jurisdiction  in  our  lands to  be  deporting  you people,  to  be 
treating you the way that they are, or us the way that they are' (Walia 2013:135) and Lee 
Maracle, indigenous feminist writer, '[y]ou [migrants] have a counter-law. It is my law. It is 
the host law of Indigenous people. Everybody eats, every woman has a right to a house, and 
everyone has access to the wealth of the land' (Walia 2013:136). Concurrently, No One Is 
Illegal in Canada does not only argue for the 'freedom to move in order to flourish with 
dignity and equality', but also: 'the freedom to stay and resist systemic displacement […] and 
the freedom to return to dispossessed lands and homes' (Walia 2013:77). Understanding the 
ways in which the same systems subordinate people in similar, but perhaps different, ways, 
and finding shared interests, as bases of forging solidarity,  alliances and coalitions among 
various groups, has for a long time been a central concern for feminists, particularly for those 
negatively  affected  along various  axes  of  power  (see  for  instance  Johnson Reagan 1998; 
Mohanty 2003). The importance of overcoming dividing lines and instead working together 
for  equality  –  'on  the  one  hand  [to]  look  for  commonalities  without  being  arrogantly 
universalist, and on the other affirm difference without being transfixed by it' (Cockburn & 
Hunter in Cockburn 2014:441) – is also part of transversal politics (Cockburn 2014; Yuval-
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Davis 1997).
Another way in which Walia's work should be of interest to gender studies is the way 
that she writes from within an activist movement, and the way that she combines theory and 
practice, making theory serve practical purposes. Another important point that also resonates 
with feminist practices is her argument about the need for prefigurative practices: enacting the 
world we want in the here and now, relating to each other in the way that we think we should. 
For  example,  movements  for  decolonisation  must  make  sure  to  properly  decolonise 
themselves and their internal practices. By combining theory, movement-based practices and 
knowledges, personal experiences and multiple voices from migrant and indigenous activists, 
her  book challenges  established  forms  of  academic  knowledge-production  as  well  as  the 
boundaries between activism and academia.
Borders as moulds and the community of value
The distinctive contribution of Anderson's analysis and arguments, compared to the others, is 
that she starts from the injunction to look at what borders  do  and what they produce.  By 
focusing on value and values she discusses how regulated migration intra-acts  with other 
power structures. In her work she focuses primarily on class, race and gender, but using the 
same framework one could easily also discuss sexuality and ability more extensively.
Borders,  she  argues,  produce  rather  than  reflect  status  and  they  create  social, 
political and economic relations (Anderson 2013:2). Status here, is not just 'about legal status, 
but fundamentally about status in the sense of worth and honour'  (2013:4). Together with 
Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright, Anderson argues that borders are moulds, they create 
certain types of subjects, subjectivities, and power relations, and not only 'good workers', but 
also 'good wives', 'straight guys and gals', 'good parents', and 'good children' (Anderson et al. 
2009:6-7). Anderson sees borders as productive not only of those who are directly subjected 
to migration control, but of everyone. Since they produce relations, and since subjectivities 
are relational, they matter for everyone. As Anderson puts it, borders 'reach into the heart of 
political space', '[t]he exclusion of migrants helps define the privileges and the limitations of 
citizenship, and close attention to the border (physical and metaphorical) reveals much about 
how we make sense of ourselves' (Anderson 2013:2).
Modern states, argues Anderson, do not just arbitrarily exclude people on the outside 
in order to maintain an administrative unit or to facilitate capital accumulation. They do not 
portray  themselves  as  'arbitrary  collections  of  people  […]  but  as  a  community  of  value', 
24
'composed  of  people  who  share  common  ideals  and  (exemplary)  patterns  of  behaviour 
expressed through ethnicity, religion, culture, or language – that is, its members have shared 
values' (Anderson 2013:2-3). By using the concept 'community of value' rather than 'nation', 
Anderson can more effectively show that not all formal citizens are good citizens (some fail,  
so to speak, to live up to the national values (2013:4, 178)). The term non-citizen is also 
normative, it does not just describe a legal status; 'outsider'  comes to mean 'not the same 
values', which comes to mean 'wrong values', and immigration debate is 'about the contours of 
the community of value as much as […] about trade offs and economic impact' (Anderson 
2013:4). It is about the norms and values underlying the community of value, that is, about the 
ideal and limits of good citizenship. 'The community of value is defined from the outside by 
the  non-citizen,  but  also  from the  inside,  by  the  “Failed  Citizen”'  (Anderson 2013:4),  as 
external and internal 'others'. Some of the figurations that Anderson discusses are 'the benefit 
scrounger' and 'the criminal' as failed citizens, and 'the illegal migrant' as the least tolerated of 
non-citizens, because of its association with 'the criminal'. All of these figurations are also 
gendered, racialised and classed.
Thus, Anderson makes a good case for why borders and the regulation of migration 
are concerns for gender studies and feminist theory more broadly: they concern everyone, 
they 'reach into the heart of political space', they are key practices through which numerous 
other power structures  are mobilised,  and they affect  some of the most  marginalised and 
shunned figures today.
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Analysis
I will analyse these five different approaches in the same order as presented above.
Sovereignty and homo sacer: Objects, differentiation, dehumanisation, and 
social relations
I will explore whether Agamben provides effective arguments and strategies against borders 
and regulated migration by plugging his arguments into the following situations and theories. 
Firstly,  I  start  by  considering  what  possibilities  of  action  Agamben  might  provide  for 
unauthorised migrants, and then I read Agamben's 'sovereignty' through Berlant's and Barad's 
theorisation of objects as both a critique of Agamben's view on sovereignty and as a way of 
making  his  arguments  more  useable  in  the  practical  work  against  regulated  migration. 
Secondly, I read him through feminist arguments – in this case represented by Alison Mountz 
– about  the need to  differentiate  and contextualise  the workings  of  power as  well  as  his 
unspecified  and  abstract  concepts.  This  leads  on  to  a  discussion  about  how representing 
people as bare life might contribute to dehumanisation – often intertwined with racialisation – 
rather than benefit  those such represented. I connect this to Puar's and Butler's arguments 
about the need to address the question of who or what can be a subject. Lastly, I plug in his  
view on sovereign power and the camp to the practical need – and reality – of social relations 
and collectivities. 
Agamben speaks to the vulnerability of many unauthorised migrants, and to the sense 
of  being  completely at  the mercy of the  state.  Human rights,  the refugee-convention and 
national  asylum  laws  sometimes  seem  to  offer  no  protection,  since  their  fulfilment  is 
completely dependent upon the state. Agamben's critique points to the inherent flaws in the 
asylum system, since in his view the sovereign is inherently incapable of properly caring for 
zoe. Agamben's arguments can thus be used to argue for the need for a radically new system, a 
new way of organising not only migration, but politics, society and communal living more 
generally. Further, since he makes it clear that we are all vulnerable in face of the sovereign – 
'we are all virtually homines sacri' – his arguments can also be used to show that this is not a 
question that is of concern only for those currently experiencing the brutality of being banned, 
but  for  everyone.  This  could  be  a  basis  for  larger  alliances  against  the  current  system. 
Agamben gives little clues as to how this could be brought about or what alternatives there 
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are. His vague gestures towards a different politics can be found in the argument that '[t]his 
biopolitical  body that  is  bare  life  must  itself  instead  be  transformed into  the  site  for  the 
constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios 
that is only its own zoe' (1998:188), that is, a form of life that is not based on the distinction 
between bios  and zoe.  Considered in  the context  of  contemporary social  movements,  his 
critique can thus be used for a radical no-border and anti-state politics.
However, for unauthorised migrants, obtaining legal status is often a top priority and 
necessity. One woman I know became apathetic because of the insecurity of not having legal 
status.  For several  years she was almost permanently in bed.  She,  her husband and their 
children had fled a war, with all the (gendered) violence this may entail,  but were denied 
asylum  and  lived  with  the  fear  of  deportation  for  almost  a  decade.  For  her,  and  other 
unauthorised residents who suffer from illnesses, pain or other problems caused by anxiety, it 
is  obtaining the security of legal  status that is needed in order to cure their  physical and 
psychological  pains.  Making  good  strategies  against  regulated  migration  must  recognise 
unauthorised residents'/migrants' need to obtain legal status, even if this entails a collaboration  
that might be seen as a reinforcement of the legitimacy of the state to decide on migration and 
a re-inscription of citizenship as something which protects us against bare life. For those who 
do not have it, obtaining citizenship and the rights it entails can not be seen as 'in vain'.
Agamben's argument that we need a total exodus from sovereignty – against any hopes 
of changing it or strategically engaging with it – might be more adjusted to the practical need 
to sometimes engage with the state, by reading his 'sovereignty' through Berlant's and Barad's 
critical examinations of 'objects'. Sovereignty, I argue, is not as coherent and singular as it 
appears in Agamben's work, a critique also made by others.  For instance,  Anne McNevin 
advances this kind of critique:
William Connolly argues that Agamben attributes to sovereign power an internal logic that simply is not 
there. Others have pointed, in this respect, to the agents of sovereign power (border guards, police, 
immigration  officials)  whose  discretionary actions  are  far  more  suggestive  of  a  highly  fragmented 
system of governance than a coherent and systematic sovereign logic (McNevin 2013:188).
Similarly Nick Dines, Nicola Montagna and Vincenzo Ruggiero argue that
it needs to be reiterated that the transformation of Lampedusa into a border zone is not the work of a  
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single  sovereign  state  power  but  the  upshot  of  a  complex  assemblage  of  governmental  (Italian,  
European and third country) and non-governmental actors engaged in migration management (Dines et 
al. 2015:436).
Looking at the object 'sovereignty' through the work of Berlant and Barad, however, provides 
a  more  theoretically  grounded  account  of  this  complexity,  pointing  to  a  much  more 
fundamental necessity to rethink all our concepts and objects of study, that this complexity is 
the case for all objects, not just sovereignty. Berlant (in Seitz 20134) argues that 'queer theory 
is fundamentally about not presuming your object' but about understanding what it is, that we 
should not  simply presume that  our  objects  of  study are given,  or  that  they are  discrete, 
identifiable 'things'. Instead of presuming our objects we should ask what our relation to the 
object is and what it does for us (see also Wiegman 2012). 'Your object is a relation, [...] your 
object  is  a  cluster  of  promises  to  you',  consisting  of  patterns  that  are  ambivalent  and 
improvisatory (Berlant in Seitz 2013). If, for example, the state or sovereignty, are seen as 
patternings rather than as coherent actors, it is easier to understand that, as Berlant (in Seitz 
2013) puts it, 'the state is a resource as well as a site of domination'.
Berlant (2006) draws on psychonalysis to make this argument while Barad takes her 
departure  in  science  studies  and  draws  particularly  on  the  physicist  Niels  Bohr.  Barad 
(2003:815) argues that 'according to Bohr, the primary epistemological unit is not independent 
objects  with  inherent  boundaries  and  properties  but  rather  phenomena'. Phenomena,  in 
Barad's  view,  'are  the  ontological  inseparability  of  agentially  intra-acting  “components”' 
(2003:815),  and  'components'  are  only  momentarily  identifiable/delimitable  within  this 
momentary  phenomena,  they  do  not  preexist  the  phenomena,  and  the  'agential  cut'  that 
separates them may be done differently at any other moment. Thus, both Berlant and Barad, 
albeit in different ways, question that objects, concepts, words and things are really as unitary, 
independent, coherent and singular as commonly conceived.
Questioning the stability and internal coherence of sovereignty is no mere theoretical 
exercise but  has  implications  for the practical  usages of  Agamben's  arguments.  As I  said 
above,  he argues  that  sovereignty will  always produce bare  life  and that  we thus  need a 
complete  exodus  from  it.  However,  Berlant  (in  Seitz  2013)  argues  that  one  benefit  of 
'[t]hinking  about  the  object  as  a  patterning  that's  loosely  organised',  is  'that  it  would  be 
possible to change the object without having to lose everything [...] So rather than saying “I 
4 This source has no page numbers.
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hate the state,” or “I love the state,” saying “here’s what the state can do”' and then ask what 
else we need that cannot be satisfied by, in this case, 'the state'. This, she argues, is enabling 
because then you can 'start to think of yourself as having a capacity to produce many kinds of 
patternings and attachments to the world'  (in Seitz 2013). For instance,  when it  comes to 
sovereignty, we might want that aspect of it that can be used to protect us and the place we 
live  from  exploitation,  protect  us  against  what  Balibar  (2002:85)  calls  'the  unfettered 
domination of the private centers of power which monopolize capital, communications and 
perhaps also, arms'.
Thinking about objects in this way, in this case specifically sovereignty, might provide 
a way in which Agamben's arguments can be made more useful for migrants in their actual 
situation. Agamben's arguments that it is futile to struggle for political liberties attached to 
citizenship, and that sovereignty will always produce bare life, seem to suggest no paths of 
action  for  people  who  are  currently  made  into  bare  life,  other  than  withdrawing  from 
sovereignty. And withdrawing and refusing to have anything to do with the state, citizenship 
and sovereignty is  impossible.  You cannot just  refuse gender,  you are  within a  system of 
gender, what you can do is to try to change it or to inhabit or do it differently. In the same 
way, you cannot just refuse sovereign power, you can try to resist it in various ways, but it  
will affect you, which becomes particularly apparent if you defy it by, for example, migrating 
without  authorisation.  Obtaining a residence permit  is  almost always a  primary need and 
objective of all the unauthorised migrants that I meet. People might, in principle, be against 
seeking this kind of permission by the state, but the consequences of not doing so are so grave 
that it is almost impossible. Given these conditions, arguments and strategies against borders 
and  regulated  migration  must  make  room for  the  need  to  at  least  partially  engage  with 
sovereignty and the state, and perhaps also to change them, at least as one step in the process 
of creating an alternative system.
Moving on to  the second focus  of my analysis  of  Agamben,  reading him through 
feminist theories that pay close attention to contexts and differentiations, his theory appears to 
be too unspecified, presented as universal. This critique is directed at the state of exception, 
the  camp  and  homo  sacer,  demonstrating  that  they  are  too  general  and  need  to  be 
differentiated, for example with respect to race, gender and nationality, and to location, place 
and context  (Mountz  2011:387).  Homo sacer,  argues  Mountz,  is  presented as a 'universal 
figure – an undifferentiated,  gender-blind, unspecified body – always outside of the state' 
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(2011:383).  While  the  generalisable  and generalising  aspects  of  power  and  exclusion  are 
important, feminist thought has long argued that it is crucial to understand the specificities of 
the  workings  of  power.  Mountz  (2011:394)  continues,  '[p]erhaps  key  to  understanding 
exclusion  is  the  balance  between  its  generalizable  aspects,  which  Agamben  masters  so 
tantalizingly and those specificities that differentiate sites, methods and people's biographies 
of in-betweenness'. Thus, while Agamben studies sovereignty as a largely undifferentiated/ing 
power, we must specify how this is entangled/intra-acts with power along the lines of for  
example gender, race, sexuality, nationality and class. This is important, since it shows some 
of the ways in which the sovereign power of Agamben does not randomly target anyone, but 
operates specifically along the aforementioned lines. We are not all 'virtually homenis sacri' to 
the  same extent,  but  according  the  same  power  structures  that  structure  most  social  and 
political life. For example, the dehumanisation of migrants that is sometimes depicted as a 
condition  homo  sacer  is  difficult  to  understand  without  the  larger  context  of  racial 
dehumanisation. What it means to be homo sacer, how it is inhabited and what risks one faces, 
also varies depending on context as well as on how one is positioned in relation to various 
power  structures.  Additionally,  it  also  means  that  the  bios,  from  which  homo  sacer  is 
excluded, is also constituted in relation to gendered, racial, sexual and classed terms.
Others, for example Dines et al. (2015) and Kim Rygiel (2011), focus not on the need 
to  differentiate  homo  sacer  and  bios  along  various  power  structure,  but  argue  that 
constructing/representing people as bare life, may spectacularise and/or dehumanise, rather 
than as perhaps intended, work in favour of those thus represented. For example pictures of 
starving and thirsting people,  rescued after  weeks at  sea,  or representations of  informally 
created  migrants  camps  as  dangerous,  lawless  places  (as  Rygiel  argues  that  the  French 
authorities represent the camp at Calais), might contribute to an othering and dehumanisation 
of migrants. Dines et al. argue that '[t]he transformation of Lampedusa into a spectacle of bare 
life is not only instrumental to the functioning of migration management at Europe's southern 
border; it is also constitutive of the subordinate position of migrants in Italian society and its 
labour market' (Dines et al. 2015:432).
Challenging  dehumanisation  is  a  recurring  feminist  and  anti-racist  theme (see  for 
example Butler 2004a and Mbembe 2003, as well as my analysis of Walia's work). It is a 
question of who or what is considered to be a human and to be a subject. Puar, in a critique of 
intersectionality, which she argues aims at decentering 'the normative subject of feminism', 
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ask how then it can 'address the problem that the construction of the subject is itself already 
normative?' (Puar 2012:63). Instead, she claims, we must interrogate subjecthood itself (Puar 
2012:62). Similarly, Butler argues that we should 'dislodge the subject as the ground for ethics 
in order to recast the subject as a problem for ethics' not as the death of the subject, but as an 
inquiry into how it is constituted, and 'how the norms that govern ethical principles must be 
understood as operating not only to guide conduct but to decide the question of who and what 
will  be a  human subject'  (Butler  2005:109-110).  Butler (2005:29)  further  argues  'that  our 
capacity to respond to a face as a human face is  conditioned and mediated by frames of 
reference that  are  variably  humanizing and dehumanizing'.  These  frames are  undoubtedly 
based on constructions of gender, race, sexuality, ability, class, and so forth, and borders (as 
well as bare life) can be seen as another frame that – entangled with the others – works in a 
de/humanising way. Constructing migrants as bare life,  might  thus contribute to them not 
being seen as subjects. This is surely not Agamben's intention, but the uses of his work might 
have this function. It points to the need to attend to what concepts do, not just what they are.
Finally,  another  important  critique  of  Agamben  that  emerges  when  reading  him 
through the practical experiences of people who could perhaps be described as homo sacer, 
and with a focus on finding effective strategies against borders, is that he does not spell out 
any forms of  collective organising.  Sovereignty and homo sacer  appear  to  be irrevocably 
individualising.  This is  not  true in  reality, because even though detention and deportation 
sometimes are extremely individualising practices – for example detention in isolation cells 
and  prohibition  of  any  contact  with  others  –  people  still  sometimes  help  each  other  to 
challenge the worst excesses of the sovereign. Further, when thinking about strategies rather 
than  only  critique,  we  also  need  a  view  on  power  that  is  not  only  and  irrevocably 
individualising, because in order to achieve change we need collective action, and we thus 
(also)  need  theories  that  can  account  for  and  make  room  for  collective  organising.  'For 
Agamben' argues Mountz, 'every citizen stands alone, authority hidden, law elusive. Feminist 
counter-topographies, conversely, offer tools for political mobilization of states of exception, 
mapping transnational linkages between sites where asylum-seekers are policed and refugee-
receiving states called into accountability' (Mountz 2011:394).
Rygiel (2011) challenges the individuating character of power in Agamben's work by 
engaging with the various representations of 'the camp'. 'The camp' is central in Agamben's 
work, as a paradigmatic example of sovereign power and the state of exception in the 20th 
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Century. It is exemplified with the Nazi extermination camps, and its inhabitants as bare life. 
Rygiel  presents  diverging  representations  and  meanings  of  the  camp,  exemplified  by  the 
migrant  camp 'the jungle'  at  Calais.  On the  one hand,  she argues,  the  authorities seek to 
construct the camp as a site of bare life and as outside of the law. This would legitimise their  
destruction of the camp, as a reassertion of state sovereignty as well as a way of presenting 
themselves  as  'protecting'  those  who live  in  the  camp,  constructed  as  its  victims  (Rygiel 
2011:9;  Dines  et  al.  2015:438).  On the  other  hand,  Rygiel  (2011:4)  argues,  the  migrants 
inhabiting the camp, as well as other activists and local residents supporting them, represent 
the camp 'as a social and political space from which a politics of citizenship might emerge'.  
According  to  Rygiel,  the  social  relations  created  within  the  camp  as  well  as  between 
inhabitants  of  the  camp,  residents  in  the  local  community  and  activists  threaten  state 
sovereignty precisely because they may form the basis upon which to create a politics that 
challenges the current border regime, and that the politics of detention, in contrast, seeks to 
prevent the formation of such social relations.
Thus,  despite  all  the  critical  force  of  Agamben's  work,  feminist  interventions  are 
needed in order to make his theory into usable and strong arguments and strategies against 
borders and regulated migration. Central objects of study – in this case sovereignty – need to 
be  seen  as  clusters  of  patternings,  practices  and  promises.  This  view  on  objects  –  as 
contradictory  and  changeable  –  is  necessary  in  order  to  reconcile  the  practical  needs  of 
unauthorised migrants of obtaining legal status, with the principled rejection of the system of 
regulated migration and the right of the state to control mobility. Further, while it is important 
to criticise the individualising aspects of power,  in order to envision good arguments and 
strategies  against  borders  we  also  need  to  recognise  that  it  is  possible  to  resist  the 
individualising  forces,  recognise  similarities,  differences  and  connections  across  time  and 
space, as well as recognise the ways in which sovereign power, exclusion, the camp and homo 
sacer  are  entangled  with  other  power  relations  such  as  gender,  race,  sexuality,  class  and 
nationality.
Rethinking  and  redoing  citizenship:  Protection,  normative  governance, 
deservingness, and imaginaries
My analysis of the approach that focuses on citizenship as a way of challenging borders and 
regulated migration will  run along the following points.  Firstly, by reading it  through the 
practical  situation  of  unauthorised  migrants  it  becomes  clear  that  a  focus  on  citizenship 
32
provides  several  possible  strategies  for  unauthorised  migrants  and  other  people  working 
practically to support them. It also shows, however, that formal citizenship still matters in a 
very material way, so while it may be deconstructed or be seen as a doing, this does not (yet?) 
adequately protect people against deportation. Secondly, reading citizenship through feminist 
intersectional theory I argue that when mobilising around citizenship, we must be cautious not 
to reproduce its current normative underpinnings. Thirdly, I note the risk of arguing for a form 
of  citizenship  (or  regularisation  programme)  that  differentiate  between  deserving  and 
undeserving  residents/migrants.  Finally,  I  read  the  focus  on  citizenship  through  Berlant's 
discussion about how, on the one hand, our attachments to objects such as citizenship may 
have become relations of 'cruel optimism', and on the other hand, that we need imaginaries 
that support a better life, and that citizenship might provide such an imaginary.
I start with the strategies that the focus on citizenship might provide for the practical 
work  against  borders  and regulated  migration.  The focus  on  citizenship  provides  various 
strategies against borders: doing citizenship, organising politically and collectively, changing 
local policies. The  doing of citizenship can also become a path not just to inclusion in the 
local community but sometimes also eventually lead to formal status (Chauvin & Garcés-
Mascareñas  2012).  These  approaches  challenge the  state  as  the  most  central  actor  in  the 
determination of rights of mobility, rights and inclusion, and instead shows that migrants and 
local actors can take matters into their own hands, without restricting themselves to waiting 
for the state to change. In addition, by disregarding legal status, they challenge its importance 
for local politics and for people's possibilities to act and to organise.
The  most  immediate  problem  is  that  doing  citizenship,  and  often  local  forms  of 
citizenship as well, do not adequately protect people against deportation and cannot make up 
for the lack of legal status. Doing citizenship, or making use of rights obtained through local 
citizenship, does not immediately create more security against the risks of apprehension and 
deportation. On the contrary, it often augments these risks for unauthorised residents since it  
entails increased visibility. For example, while the right of unauthorised residents to access 
social services is contested and legally unclear, many people I know are anxious about asking 
the social services for help because of the risk it entails. Even though social workers would 
breach confidentiality if they reported them to the police, there is always a risk that the social 
worker in question does not know this (until a few years ago this was a legal procedure). I 
also know of  young people who have been apprehended by the police when going to  or 
33
coming from psychiatric clinics. Being actively, visibly political entails even more risks. I 
know people who are public with their lack of legal status, name and face – figuring in photos 
and videos or speaking at demonstrations – but most people would not take this risk, since if 
their  faces are known they could  much more  easily  be reported and apprehended by the 
police. Taking part in demonstrations or protests, even without taking a leading role, is also a 
considerable  risk,  since  you could be  required to  show ID to  the  police if  there are  any 
disturbances. Being publicly political as an unauthorised resident requires a lot of courage.
Further, as long as formal citizenship continues to have significance, it is a serious 
issue of inequality if  some people only have local  or partial  form of citizenship.  Monica 
Varsanyi  (2006:238) argues that  'institutions of political membership below and beyond the 
nation-state are not yet potent enough (and may not be in the near to medium term) to provide 
adequate protection or alternative structures of belonging'. Consequently, we cannot stop at 
deconstructing citizenship or doing it differently, but must in some way ensure that it can also 
lead to more safety and to equality. This could be done either, as Varsanyi argues, by making 
the  rethinking of  citizenship 'be[ing]  tied back in  with discounted structures  of  legal  and 
formal citizenship'  (2006:238),  or  by finding other  ways to  limit  the importance  of  legal 
status. That is, deconstructing citizenship or seeing it as a process or a doing must also lead to 
materially  more  security  either  by  also  leading  to  changes  in  the  acquisition  of  formal 
citizenship or by limiting the significance of formal citizenship, for example by limiting the 
right of the state to deport non-citizens. Just as is the case with other forms of oppression, 
changes  in  civil  society  or  local  policies  are  important,  but  legal  forms  of  exclusion  or 
oppression must also be addressed.
Moving on, if citizenship is used as a vehicle or objective of struggle, the normative 
underpinnings  of  citizenship  must  be  taken  into  account  and  challenged.  This  means 
understanding that people have different possibilities of doing acts that count as citizenship, 
and thus different possibilities of being recognised as citizens. For instance, the definition of 
political acts is gendered and classed. Participating in party-politics, public demonstrations or 
public debate might be considered political acts whereas engagement in the local community, 
caring for others by providing food and a place to stay, breaking with dominant norms and 
expectations, or simply struggling to survive, may not. Undocumented migrants with higher 
education, knowledge of English and/or the local language and who perhaps have a larger 
social network, have much more possibilities to do citizenship than those who can hardly read 
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or write or who have a harder time learning the local languages. Having previous experience 
of  political  work  might  also  make it  easier  to  organise  in  one's  new place  of  residence. 
Further, someone who has children to care for or other dependants might be less willing to 
take the risks of being too public. Of course, this does not mean that people without formal 
education, little knowledge of local languages, no previous experience of political work, who 
have disabilities, and who have dependants, do not work politically, or do things that can be 
seen as citizenship, but it demonstrates the need to question the normative underpinning of 
how citizenship is done. It also shows that we need more strategies to challenge borders than 
that of doing citizenship.5
The focus on citizenship may also strengthen its  normative underpinnings and the 
power structures with which it is entangled. If we argue that people should be considered 
citizens because they do what citizens (should) do – for example engage in public life in a 
particular way, work and contribute to the economy, raise children to become good future 
citizens – then we are also strengthening these normative ideals, these 'duties' as important, as  
well as this particular way of doing them. It strengthens a normative and productive ideal of 
citizenship at the expense of political projects that question the duties of labour, reproduction, 
consumption, propriety, self-sufficiency, etc. This is the critique of homonormativity and the 
model  minority  syndrome (which  I  will  discuss  at  greater  length further  on):  by seeking 
recognition  and  acceptance  as  proper  citizens  and  as  part  of  national  life,  the  norms 
underpinning  these  are  strengthened  (Puar  2007;  Walia  2010).  Citizenship  is  a  form  of 
governance (Luibhéid 2005; De Genova 2007 & 2010). Thus, if we mobilise for its expansion 
or rethinking, we also have to make sure that we do not reproduce some of the regulating and 
normative structures that currently operate through it.
Another related issue is that many arguments resort to claiming that a person – or  
group – deserves to be considered citizen, to have rights, or to be allowed to stay. This is a 
significant problem because arguing, for instance, that all children deserve health care implies 
that not all adults do, or arguing that all people who are born 'here' (wherever the boundaries 
of 'here' are) deserve citizenship implies that not everyone born 'elsewhere' do. For example, 
the slogan 'good enough to work, good enough to stay' (Walia 2010:81), implies that those 
who are not working – who perhaps cannot work – are not 'good enough to stay'.6 It is also 
5 For example in the US there are millions of unauthorised residents who do citizenship, and the fact that some 
eventually gain legal status does not directly help those who for various reasons do not qualify.
6 Many regularisation programmes based on labour also risk making migrants even more dependent on their 
employer, and basically grant employers the right to decide who can stay and who cannot.
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easy to fall into the trap of arguing according to this logic of the deserving or undeserving 
when campaigning in individual cases. If there are no other reasons that would resonate with 
the public and/or stand a chance of being legally recognised, I have myself felt compelled to  
argue, for example, that a person really cannot be deported to Afghanistan because they have 
no network to rely on for support, thus indirectly implying that it would be more acceptable to 
deport someone who has a local network. Or that a person must be allowed to stay because 
their  partner  lives  'here',  and  because  they  have  lived  'here'  for  many  years,  indirectly 
implying that it would be more acceptable to deport someone who has not lived 'here' for as  
many years, or who does not have a partner 'here' (but who perhaps has other – less legitimate 
– relationships, or who perhaps is alone). It is understandable that one resorts to a variety of 
arguments in the desperate situation of trying to stop one's own or someone else's deportation 
– but it is indeed problematic. It undermines the possibility of obtaining rights or residence 
permits for those who do not have legible, legally recognisable, and publicly resonant reasons 
to stay, and it reinforces the very idea that one needs a reason to be allowed to move and to 
stay, and that whether one deserves to stay or to have rights depends on what one does, who 
one 'is', or what one's situation is.
The critique against differentiating between different people's deservingness is present 
in some versions of the focus on citizenship. Varsanyi (2006:241), for instance, argues that 
one of the benefits of 'local citizenship' policies, as opposed to citizenship as process or as a 
doing, is that local citizenship is in a sense 'universal', it applies to everyone in a place with no  
conditions other than inhabitance. Anderson (2013), whose work I will discuss further on, is 
also critical of the logic of deservingness, a critique that she makes clear by pointing to the 
similarities in the structural positions of 'illegal migrants' and 'the undeserving poor'. Thus, 
arguments for the expansion of citizenship – or for the freedom of mobility and right to stay – 
should instead be based on solidarity and equality: that everyone, just by virtue of existing, 
should have the freedom to move and stay, and the right to dignified living.
Moving on, I read the focus on citizenship through the work of Berlant. She argues:
When I first started working on citizenship, older people would say to me, 'How can you even take the  
state seriously? The state is a monster of imperialism.' And I said, 'I'm on the side of people's survival,  
and if people's optimism is attached to things like the state, I want to know what the state stands in for.' 
If we start seeing our objects of ambition and desire as stand-ins, as things that organize our attachment 
to life, we have a totally different understanding and a kind of generosity toward those objects. That's  
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why I started working on citizenship in the first place, not because I loved it, but because I saw that  
people saw it as a state where they could imagine being collective, and being willing to be collective in 
ways that were also inconvenient for them (Berlant in Seitz 2013).
Paying attention to our attachments to objects – such as citizenship or the state – to what they 
'stand in for', which desires and imaginations are attached to them, what the objects do for us, 
is central in Berlant's work. She argues that our sense of continuation of life and meaning is 
attached to objects around us, for example a partner, an employment, a dream, the nation, or 
citizenship. These 'objects', however, will never fulfil the desires we have invested in them, 
and in that sense Berlant argues that 'all attachments are optimistic' and that optimism is an 
affective form (2006:20). Talking about objects as 'clusters of promises […] allow[s] us to 
encounter what is incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments', it can be 'an explanation for our 
sense of our endurance in the object' (2006:20). Since it is often difficult to detach from these 
objects even when they fail us – because of the way in which they provide a sense of meaning 
and attachment to the world – we sometimes continue to nurse attachments to objects that no 
longer do their job, or that undermine the possibility of realising the desire attached to the 
object in question. This is what Berlant calls 'cruel optimism': 'the condition of maintaining an 
attachment to a problematic object  in advance of its loss'.  That is, the object  x's presence 
threatens one's well-being and the very potency of the desire attached to it contributes to the 
demise of the conditions for x's thriving, but one cannot endure losing it because it offers a 
'sense of what  it  means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world' 
(2006:21). One could thus consider whether our attachments to the state or to citizenship are 
relations of cruel optimism. Does our attachment to the state and to citizenship entail desires 
for equality, collectivity, freedom and safety, and is the realisation of these desires ultimately 
undermined rather than served by citizenship and the state? Agamben and De Genova would 
probably agree that this is the case.
However, Berlant (in Seitz 2013) also argues that we need imaginaries and institutions 
that support a better life. As indicated in the quotation above, if citizenship is a way in which 
people can 'imagine being collective, and being willing to be collective in ways that were also 
inconvenient for them', then it could perhaps also support better imaginaries and institutions. 
Jacques Rancière (in Nyers & Rygiel 2012:11) argues that 'perhaps what is as important as the 
acquisition  of  legal  status  is  what  citizenship  mobilises  in  its  name'  because  'politics  is 
mobilised in the “gap” or discrepancy between the desire and belief of “a right to have rights” 
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and the absence of the materialisation of those rights'. In this view it becomes important to 
have positive imaginaries of what we could have, of how society could be, because we are 
politically mobilised by the fact that what we could have or should have is not materialised. 
Thus, if citizenship is such an object that provides imaginaries of a better life and a sense of 
what we could and should have, there might be advantages to mobilising around it, just as 
there might be in retaining 'democracy', 'rights', 'freedom', 'equality' or 'justice' as objects that 
can provide better worlds, despite their failure to materialise. However, if using citizenship, or 
any of these objects, as something worth struggling for, we should also always engage in a 
struggle over its meaning, by focusing, to use Berlant's vocabulary, on those patternings of an 
object that serve our aims. As explained above,  '[t]hinking about the object as a patterning 
that's loosely organised, [is enabling because it makes it] possible to change the object without 
having to lose everything' (Berlant in Seitz 2013).
The focus on citizenship provides, to a greater extent than several of the other forms of 
arguments  against  borders,  examples  of  practices  in  the  here  and  now which  prove  that 
alternatives are not just imaginable but immediately possible, such as sanctuary cities and 
other forms of local citizenship policies (Walia 2013; Nyers & Rygiel 2012; Varsanyi 2006). 
Butler (2004b:29) argues,  '[t]he critical promise of fantasy, when and where it exists, is to 
challenge the contingent limits of what will and will not be called reality. Fantasy is what 
allows us to imagine ourselves and others otherwise; it establishes the possible in excess of 
the real;  it points elsewhere, and when it is embodied, it brings the elsewhere home', and 
sanctuary cities make some of that imagination tangible,  as a material  elsewhere you can 
travel to, and as a material home.
Thus, focusing on citizenship has the advantage of providing alternative imaginings as 
well  as  concrete  strategies,  but  it  has  to  be  remembered  that  doing  citizenship  or  local 
citizenship is not a sufficient alternative to formal citizenship as long as the latter continues to 
be important. We also need equality and stronger protection against deportation. It also has to 
be kept in mind that citizenship is a technology of governance that is intertwined with gender, 
class, race, sexuality, nationality, etc.
Deportability, labour and the state: Disengagement, power entanglements, 
and asylum
In my analysis of De Genova's arguments against borders I focus on three different things. 
Firstly,  I  read his  critique  against  struggling through citizenship  or  the state,  through the 
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practical context of trying to cope with regulated migration. Secondly, I read him through 
feminist arguments about the need to consider various power structures, showing that borders 
both target and produce people differently. Lastly, by focusing on asylum-migration rather 
than primarily labour, as De Genova does, I develop the argument that borders produce more 
things, subjects and relations than only capital accumulation.
De  Genova  does  not  spell  out  any  concrete  strategies  of  action,  apart  from  his 
argument against struggling through citizenship or seeking recognition from the state in the 
form of citizenship, since this, he argues, would reinscribe the legitimacy and necessity of the 
state, as well as undermine the wider struggles by domesticating insurgent energies within the 
orbit of the state (De Genova 2007:441-2). Struggling through or for citizenship is also, in De 
Genova's  view,  a  symptom  of  still  being  caught  within  methodological  nationalism  and 
methodological  stasism (De Genova  2013).  However,  as  I  have  already discussed  in  my 
analysis of Agamben, since it is very difficult and dangerous to live without authorisation, not 
least in a very formalised society such as Sweden (Hellgren 2014), in my view it is untenable 
to maintain a strategy of non-engagement with the state. Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis 
Tsianos (2013:193) speak of their collaborator, Sapik, who chose to return to a life without 
legal status in Greece instead of obtaining residence permit in Germany; but not everyone 
could make that  choice.  Who can live  with  that  insecurity?  What if  you really  need the 
security of legal status as a guarantee that you will not be deported, so that you can start 
processing your traumas? What if you have your children with you? What if you need to 
know you can stay in order to imagine a future? Obtaining a residence permit is the top 
priority of most people I know who live without legal status, and the struggle to obtain it 
cannot  be  dismissed  as  in  vain,  as  misguided,  or  as  wrong.  For  all  the  problematic 
implications of seeking recognition and permission from the state, one cannot dismiss the 
immediate necessity of doing so for those who are currently refused it. From my experience, 
we have to engage with the state even if we do not like it. We have to try to obtain residence 
permits for those who do not have it but who want it. People's lives must, when in conflict,  
stand above a principled opposition to the state and to citizenship. We also have to engage 
with the state in making education, health care and other social services available to everyone, 
independent of their migration status. Then of course, as I argue elsewhere, we must think 
about  how we engage with the state, on what terms, and what arguments we use (see for 
example McNevin 2013 and Walia 2013:182-7 for the same kind of arguments).
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In addition, as Tanya Basok, Danièle Bélanger and Eloy Rivas (2014:1397) observe, 
'when migrant workers attempt to minimise the disciplinary power of the deportation regime, 
they  engage  in  practices  of  discipline  and  self-discipline  and  thereby  co-construct  the 
deportation regime'. This points to the difficulty of avoiding, escaping or standing outside of 
the reach of the state and the border-regime, and thus the need for strategies that provide ways 
of being  in  them, of changing them and of dealing with them, rather than arguing, as De 
Genova implies, that we have to refrain from engaging with them.
Moving on to my second topic, reading De Genova's arguments through the embodied 
lives of unauthorised migrants and through feminist theory, points to at least one issue that 
warrants  further  attention: how borders  and deportability  are  entangled  with  other  power 
structures. The fact that De Genova does not discuss this, except race, to which he does pay 
attention, means that he does not provide enough means of understanding how people are 
differently targeted by borders and deportability. They do indeed target people differently and 
people  are  varyingly  vulnerable  to  them.  For  example,  Tanya  Golash-Boza  and  Pierrette 
Hondagneu-Sotelo (referred to in Doering-White et al. 20147) argue that there is a 'gendered 
racial removal program' in the US particularly targeting Mexican and central american men. 
Furthermore, appearance makes people more or less vulnerable. Writing about 'white space' 
(and nations might be imagined as such), Ahmed (2007:161-3) argues that some bodies are 
more easily identifiable as 'out of place', as 'strangers', that some bodies – more than others – 
encounter resistance when moving through space and are 'stopped'. When it comes to in-state 
enforcement  of  immigration  law,  Kate  Hepworth  (in  Villegas  2015:188)  argues  that  '[a]n 
individual may be identified as out-of-place through somatic traits such as race, as well as 
through more intimate, emplaced relations: through how that body behaves in place […] how 
the body is clothed […] the activities in which it is engaged […] its emplacement in time or  
space  and the  manner  of  that  emplacement'.  Other  factors  may  also  increase  the  general 
vulnerability of lacking legal status. As Paloma Villegas shows, precarious legal status might 
make women and LGBTIQ-people more vulnerable to harassment and deportation, since they 
cannot,  in  cases  of  harassment  or  violations,  fight  back,  challenge  it  or  report  it  to  the 
authorities  in  they  way  they  could  have  done  if  their  legal  status  was  secure,  which 
perpetrators might know and exploit (Villegas 2015:191-2). Depending on class, racialisation 
and other factors, people also have different possibilities to 'pass' as a citizen or as having 
7 This source has no page numbers.
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legal status (see for example Villegas 2015:188).
If,  as  Catherine  Dauvergne  puts  it,  '[w]e  imagine  illegals  as  poor  and brown and 
destitute'  (in  Villegas  2015:186),  those  who are read  as  such are  at  greater  risk  of  being 
stopped in internal border controls. Those who do not 'stand out' or who can pass as legal, are 
not safe, but safer. As a friend of mine explained, when he was 'illegally' travelling through 
Europe to get to Sweden, if it were not for his light skin tone he might not have been able to 
pass unnoticed. He said people probably read him as Italian rather than Afghan. Or as another 
person told me, when encountering police officers checking IDs as part of the internal border 
controls, the fact that he had a girlfriend whose 'Swedishness' was never questioned and that 
they  spoke  Swedish  with  each  other,  meant  that  he  was  not  stopped  while  most  other 
negatively racialised people were.8 Paying attention to how borders and deportability affect 
and target people differently provides more complex accounts of how they work, and is also 
necessary when it comes to strategy. It shows that people have very different possibilities for 
dealing  with  deportability  and  for  subverting  borders,  that  people  might  need  different 
strategies for coping with it. Further, it also suggests that deportability and borders  produce 
more than just  docile  workers,  which  is  what  De Genova focuses  on.  For  instance,  they 
produce  women,  LGBTIQ-people,  or  racialised  people  who  are  unable  (or  less  able)  to 
respond  to,  challenge  or  report  harassment,  hate-crimes  or  other  forms  of  violence  or 
injustices committed against them; they produce whiteness by encouraging people to pass, 
and by disproportionally  deporting people otherwise racialised;  and they make  LGBTIQ-
people  pass  as  straight  and gender-conforming in  order  to  avoid  exposing  themselves  to 
dangerous situations.
Moving on, I will now read De Genova's arguments through the context of asylum-
migration. De Genova primarily discusses migration through labour, but reading him in the 
context in which I am active – where most of the unauthorised migrants I meet have migrated 
primarily in order to claim asylum – provides a more complex account  of how the state, 
borders  and  regulated  migration  work,  and  how  they  are  entangled  with  other  power 
structures. For many working within the 'autonomous migration' approach, which De Genova 
does, it is a conscious decision to resist 'the heterogenising practices of state regulation of 
mobility' which divides it into different 'types' of migration, for example labour, asylum or 
family,  and  instead  they  'attempt[...]  to  articulate  their  commonalities'  (Papadopoulos  & 
8 This was in Stockholm 2013, during the infamous REVA-campaign.
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Tsianos 2013:185). I maintain, however, that despite the intentions, this homogenising entails 
a risk of losing critical insight.
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  'the  refugee'  is  imagined  as  a  man  fleeing 
persecution by a totalitarian state and seeking asylum in the liberal, tolerant states of the West 
(Anderson 2013:55-6). This means that people fleeing from something that does not fit well 
into this idea often have troubles being recognised. Gender and sexuality often pose particular 
problems to obtaining recognition (which is not to say that it is otherwise easy). In order to 
think  about  recognition  I  turn  to  Bulter,  even  though  her  work  on  recognition  is  not 
specifically about asylum it is still applicable in this context. The process of deciding who is 
recognizable,  or  trustworthy,  as  human,  and  specifically  who fulfils  the  requirements  for 
asylum, is governed by the language and norms that frame this situation, and by the narrative 
capacity for giving a legible account (see for example Butler 2005:12). As Butler argues, 
'there is a language that frames the encounter, and embedded in that language is a set of norms  
concerning  what  will  and  will  not  constitute  recognizability'  (Butler  2005:30).  I  must 
conform,  among  other  things,  to  the  norms  of  narration  and  causality,  as  well  as  the 
categories, classifications and identificatory schemas that govern this situation, which in the 
context of asylum are not only specifically western and liberal, but also specifically legal. If 
you are, for instance, seeking asylum on the basis of sexuality you must also be recognisable 
as say, a lesbian. You must tell your story in a chronological narrative, use a language and 
reasoning which  is  understood,  and  conform to  the  adjudicators'  conceptions  of  how for 
example  'lesbians',  'trans*people',  or  'women'  are,  look  and  act,  conceptions  that  are 
sometimes narrowly western, middle-class, heteronormative and liberal, and sometimes, on 
the contrary, racialised conceptions about what, for example, 'Muslim women' do or look like.  
As Katherine Fobear (2014:52) puts it: 'the effort to prove to the adjudicators that they belong 
to  a  sexual  and/or  gender  minority  becomes  heavily  racialized  and  classed.  Sexual 
exceptionalism  works  by  first  glossing  over  the  boundaries  of  gender,  race,  and  class 
formations and then implicitly privileging white and western gay norms'.
There are innumerable examples. Lesbians can be denied asylum because they do not 
look 'lesbian', because they have children, or because they do not show any interest in 'lesbian 
culture'  (Lewis  2013).  In  my  experience  LGBTIQ-people  may  be  rejected  because  they 
cannot provide a narrative account of when they first realised that they 'were' LGBTIQ or 
reflect  in  sufficiently  elaborate  ways  on  their  sexuality/identity.  People  may  be  refused 
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because  it  is  not  deemed credible  that  a  woman in  a  patriarchal  society  would  defy  her 
husband, or because the asylum adjudicators are unable to recognise that men can also be 
victims of honour-violence.
The  asylum-system  is  part  of  the  production  of  worlds  and  nations.  It  produces 
identities, performances, discourses and representations, enacted both by asylum-seekers and 
their supporters and by the state. Sima Shakhsari (2013:568) argues that '[i]n order to present 
a successful and legitimate claim to asylum officers, the refugee/asylum seeker often has to 
repeat  a  story that  inevitably  demonizes  the  “home country”'  and Lewis  claims,  '[i]n  the 
context  of  refugee  law,  states  will  only  grant  political  asylum  to  women  who  appear 
vulnerable either because they are openly lesbian or because they are foreign women in need 
of rescue from oppressive patriarchal – read third world – cultures' (Keenan 2011:39 in Lewis 
2013:180). Similarly, Fobear (2014:53) argues that '[i]n order to prove persecution, sexual and 
gender minority claimants may have to inferiorize and pathologize their ethnic, religious, or 
cultural communities in order to fit into Canada's national fantasies of being a safe haven to 
marginalized  populations'.  Further,  through  the  state's  management  of  'the  political  and 
cultural production of refugee identities in public sphere',  presenting refugees (particularly 
women)  as  victims and Canada as  the  'white  knight'  saviour,  'the  whiteness  of  Canadian 
settlement is maintained through the othering of refugees as inherently separate to the nation' 
(Fobear  2014:51).  This demonises  and inferiorises  places  that  people have fled from and 
elevates the receiving states above such things, 'produc[ing] a discursive erasure of the very 
real  forms  of  heterosexism and  homo/transphobic  violence  present  in  Canada  [and  other 
asylum-receiving places in the Global North] today' (2014:53).
Thus, attending to asylum, and in particular to the problems facing many women and 
LGBTIQ-people  seeking  asylum,  demonstrates  two  interrelated  things:  borders  produce 
particular  forms  of  gender  and  sexuality,  and  the  state  gains  more  than  just  capital 
accumulation. The state produces itself as 'modern', 'tolerant' and 'generous', differentiating 
itself from 'other' 'backwards', 'intolerant',  'uncivilised', 'oppressive' places. Asylum plays a 
significant  role  in  the  production  of  the  national  self-image  as  well  as  in  geopolitics 
(manifested in, for example, the principled acceptance – or rejection – of all asylum-seekers 
from a particular country in order to make a point about the situation in that country of origin) 
(Shakhsari 2013; Fobear 2014; Luibhéid 2005:xvii; Anderson 2013).
Reading  De  Genova's  arguments  through  feminist  theory  and  through  material 
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contexts, it becomes clear that his view on the state and borders as having only one, or at least 
one primary, objective and logic – capital – needs to be complicated. Firstly, as the wealth of 
scholarship on intersectionality has made clear: various power structures are entangled/intra-
act, and to understand how capitalism, economic exploitation and borders work, one has to 
attend to how they are entangled with, say, race, gender,  sexuality, ability and nationality. 
Secondly, as I discussed above in the section on Agamben, objects – the state, or borders – are 
not  singular,  unitary,  coherent  'things',  but  complex and contradictory sets  of  patternings, 
promises and projections (Berlant 2006) or 'phenomena' in 'intra-action' (Barad 2003). This is 
not only a theoretical argument but is also apparent empirically. The state consists of a great 
variety  of  departments,  branches,  agencies,  civil  servants,  locations,  layers,  practices  and 
promises,  and surely  all  of  these  sometimes  have disparate  objectives  and sometimes  do 
things that have completely contradictory outcomes. The same goes for borders. The state and 
borders  may  have  several  objectives  and  outcomes  –  facilitating  capital  accumulation, 
securing legitimacy among its inhabitants, securing continued governance for the incumbent 
parties, and creating a favourable standing in the international arena – while individual civil 
servants may have other priorities, such as keeping their job, advancing their career, keeping 
budget, or even using their position to do as much good as possible. Sometimes these go hand 
in  hand,  but  sometimes  they  do  not.  To  properly  understand  how  borders  work  –  and 
consequently to make good arguments and strategies against them – we must properly take 
into account  how they are entangled with multiple power structures,  how they may serve 
various  different  objectives  on  part  of  the  state,  and how both  the  state  and borders  are 
internally complex and contradictory.
Thus, borders produce not only an exploitable labour-force, but also a range of other 
subjects. As Anderson et al. (2009:7) argue, '[i]t is not only “hard workers” who are produced 
at the border. “Good wives” who do not challenge patriarchal families, “straight guys and 
gals” who adhere to correct sexual scripts, “good parents” whose parenting accords with the 
requirements  to  produce  “good  children”  are  policed  through  immigration  requirements'. 
Thus, borders do not just produce capital accumulation and economic inequality, they also 
produce nations, Peoples9, populations, families, hetero- and homonormativity, racialisation of 
people and of places, and shape thinking, theory and methodology (see for example Wimmer 
and Glick Schiller (2002) and De Genova (2013) on methodological nationalism).
9 On various meanings of 'the people' see Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002:308-9; Agamben 2000:29-35; and 
Jonsson 2005.
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To conclude, while there are several good points in De Genova'a arguments, to make 
them better, and to make them into useful strategies, they must be complicated. This necessary 
complication occurs primarily by connecting them to various other power structures, and by 
seeing the state and borders not  as monolithic,  given, things,  but  as complex patternings, 
involving a variety of practices, that may both be resources to us, and sites of domination 
(Berlant in Seitz 2013), and with which we sometimes have to interact, even if we would 
prefer to bypass them altogether.
Indigenous  perspectives  and  border  imperialism:  Strategies,  homo-
nationalism, the freedom to stay, and necropolitics
In order to explore in what ways Walia's work might provide good arguments and strategies 
against borders, and how they might be further developed, I focus on four topics. Firstly, by 
attending to the practical situation of unauthorised migrants' immediate need for a residence 
permit I discuss what might appear as a strategical contradiction to seek permission by the 
state whilst being opposed to regulated migration. I explore this possible dilemma by reading 
it through Butler, Berlant and Barad. Secondly, I read Walia through Puar's work on sexuality 
and homonationalism. Thirdly, I focus on (the indigenous demand for) 'the freedom to stay' 
and connect it to the need to pay attention to people's very varying possibilities or abilities to 
migrate and to be mobile.  Finally,  I take the cue from Walia's argument about borders as 
racialising practices and turn to Achille Mbembe to discuss the racialised indifference to the 
death of migrants.
Unsurprisingly,  since Walia writes from within a movement of migrant justice,  her 
arguments  provide  much  more  concrete  and  applicable  strategies  than  any  other  of  the 
approaches that I discuss here. She argues for the need to build solidarity and alliances with 
other  groups,  particularly  indigenous  peoples,  and  her  arguments  about  the  connection 
between borders, capitalism and racialisation should also encourage solidarity on behalf of 
otherwise racialised peoples who have citizenship or secure migration status, as well as on the 
part of wage labourers. The strategies she discusses take into account the immediate situation 
and needs of unauthorised migrants. For example, she recognises the need of
navigating state institutions like border agencies,  immigration offices […] in order to support those 
facing  detention  and  deportation.  Such  organizing  to  meet  the  immediate  needs  of  undocumented 
migrants and refugees changes migrants' material conditions by, for example, winning legal resident 
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status, which then facilitates them becoming more involved in radical movements. It also works to build 
long-term relationships of confidence and trust, and provides a means through which to share our own 
analysis (Walia 2013:183).
The strategy of creating sanctuary cities (Walia 2013:111-7) – where the local municipality 
decides that formal migration status does not matter for the provision of its services – is 
another strategy that engages with some branches of the state – local municipalities – and that 
could thus be seen as reformist, but she argues that it still serves the wider goals because it  
improves  the  material  situation  of  people,  it  provides  a  basis  of  involvement  by  various 
sectors of society, it advances the demand of status for all, and it works as a prefigurative 
practice where alternative visions are materialised. Based on these practical experiences and 
on other people's work, she argues that in practice, there is no strict dualism between reformist 
and  revolutionary  strategies  (2013:182-7).  However,  she  also  argues  for  the  need  to  be 
conscientious about  how to engage with the state: 'NOII [No One Is Illegal] would not, for 
example, work toward a selective regularization policy that would benefit some migrants but 
exclude those migrants with criminal records or those on social assistance' (Walia 2013:184). 
The  way  she  spells  out  these  practical,  strategical  issues  is  much  more  useful  than  the 
arguments  which  regard  all  struggles  that  engage  with  the  state  and  its  institutions  as 
reformist, conformist and futile.
Reading  Walia's  discussion  about  strategies  through  Butler,  Berlant  and  Barad 
provides  more  theoretical  perspectives  on  how  to  think  about  the  strategic  dilemma  of 
engagement with, or withdrawal, from the state and regulated migration. White  argues that 
'migrant politics and queer and trans politics' have a shared problematic issue, namely 'the 
relationship between tactics and imaginaries' (White 2014:978). White cites Butler who calls 
this  tension a 'performative  contradiction',  and who argues  that '[t]here  can be no radical 
change without performative contradiction … The contradiction must be relied on, exposed, 
and worked on to move toward something new. There seems to be no other way'  (White 
2014:976-8). That is, Butler argues that it is impossible not to act within the current situation:  
'[o]bviously, the political task is not to refuse representational politics – as if we could', and 
'there  is  no  position outside  this  field'  (2010:7).  Rather,  Butler's  argument  that  gender  is 
performative means that gender is an act, and by virtue of being an act it can also be changed. 
Change does not require outright refusal, but is apparent in every little iteration doing gender 
differently. Acts reference and cite what is already there, but they may reference and cite with 
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a  difference,  with  a  twist,  without  merely  replicating  the  previous  acts  or  scripts.  Butler 
explains: 'The productions swerve from their original purposes and inadvertently mobilize 
possibilities of “subjects” that do not merely exceed the bounds of cultural intelligibility, but 
effectively expand the boundaries of what is, in fact, culturally intelligible' (2010:40). Despite 
the completely different context of Butler's arguments, they might still be applicable to work 
against regulated migration. When navigating migration law, it is impossible not to take part 
in  representational  politics  –  you  and  your  case  must  be  intelligible  according  to  the 
representations of an eligible candidate of  residency ('refugee',  'lesbian',  'family',  'worker', 
etc.) – and the costs of refusing to be recognised by migration law are often far too high for 
that to be a viable option, if you have a choice. Thus, while it may sometimes be necessary to 
navigate this system, we can do so strategically, subverting it, mobilising possibilities that 
were not there before, while always keeping the larger transformation and imaginary in mind 
(White 2014:991-2; Walia 2013:182-4).
The same process – changing something by engaging with it (as a strategic choice or 
out of necessity, since there is no position that is not produced in relation to it) – would be  
conceptualised differently by Berlant, or by Barad, whose arguments about the possibilities 
for changing objects were discussed in the section on Agamben. Berlant (in Seitz 2013) would 
say that since objects are clusters of patternings, promises, projections, by making them do 
certain things and not others, by using some of these patternings but not others, objects can 
change. Barad (2003) would say that objects as phenomena are delimited in the intra-action 
that is the phenomena, and that the 'agential cuts' between its constitutive parts might always 
be done differently. In each new 'momentum' they can be arranged differently (2003:814-5). 
Objects can thus change. Thus, when White (2014:992) argues that 'queer anti-deportation 
activists  do  not  only  unwittingly  reproduce  methodological  nationalisms,  they  do  so 
strategically in order to make their claims hearable by the state', this strategy should always 
aim to undermine methodological nationalism, borders and the state. That is, not only aim to 
be heard by the state, but by being heard, to fundamentally change it. This also requires that 
we think about how we engage with the state and what the engagement is used for.
I now turn to a consideration of sexuality. Plugging Walia's and Puar's work into each 
other might provide useful insights and paths for further applications or developments of both 
frameworks.  Walia  does take into account the often central role  of women and queers in 
mobilising  and  in  community  building,  and  she  connects  the  nation  to  heteropatriarchal 
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structures, for example in her argument against the distinction between 'good/desirable/real 
migrant (read:  English-speaking, employed, and/or conforming to heteropatriarchal  norms) 
versus bad/undesirable/bogus migrant (read: unemployed, without formal education, and/or 
with a criminal record)' (Walia 2013:77). However, she does not provide any more extensive 
analyses of the significance of sexuality and gender in racialisation processes and in nation 
building.  Puar,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  sexuality,  racialisation  and nationalism are 
entangled in multiple ways. Firstly, racialisation often involves sexualisation. For instance, 
through orientalist imaginings, which currently produce the figure of 'the terrorist', Muslim 
populations are sexualised and racialised as 'pedophilic, sexually lascivious and excessive, yet 
perversely repressed' (Puar 2007:20). Racialised populations (at least when combined with 
poverty) are seen as in need of improved marital practices (Puar 2007:29; Rytter 2012), and 
the  sexualisation  of  terrorism becomes  apparent  in  the  very  frequent  use  of  homophobic 
imaginaries  to  satirize  and  to  humiliate  'the  terrorist'  (Puar  2007:37-78).  Secondly,  the 
combination of being queer and racialised – or even more so, Muslim – is seen as impossible. 
This pernicious dualism – 'the homosexual other is white, the racial other is straight' (Puar 
2007:32) – 'mutates from a narrative of incommensurate subject positionings into a “Islam 
versus homosexuality” tug of populations at war' (2007:19). In this way, nationalist projects, 
from borders and migration control to interventions in other countries, are legitimised in the 
name of 'human rights' and the protection of LGBT-people. Moreover, sexuality is mobilised 
to strengthen the imaginary of the exceptional excellence of the home nation. By depicting 
others as barbaric, uncivilised, repressed, excessive, and perverse, the nation is constructed as 
tolerant, civilised and emblematic of proper sexual behaviour (which is no longer limited to 
heterosexuality,  but  which  can  also  involve  domesticated  and  normative  homosexuality). 
Nationalism  thus  provides  a  route  towards  rehabilitation  for  previously  excluded  sexual 
others. Homonormativity (a normativity that mimics the heterosexual norms of monogamy, 
marriage, class, gender conformity, and a whiteness that is available also to model minority 
ethnics), the patriotic spending of gay tourism, gay marriage, and participation in the military 
all serve to fold gay people (back) into (national) life (Puar 2007).
Hence, when Walia discusses the ways in which Canada is produced as white and the 
racial hierarchy is maintained by the simultaneous exclusion and subordination of indigenous 
peoples and of migrants, one should also consider the role of sexuality within this framework. 
This could be enacted by, for example, paying attention to the settler state's regulation of 
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indigenous  sexuality  and  family  life  (Egan  & Place  2012:134-5);  the  sexual  norms  that 
underpin the laws regarding family migration (Puar 2007:29; Luibhéid 2005); the ways in 
which sexuality becomes part of citizenship norms (as Anderson 2013 argues); the specific 
disciplinary acts that target migrants' sexuality (Basok et al. 2014:1401); and the extent to 
which it increases their risk of deportation (Villegas 2015:191-2). Whiteness and racialisation 
work through, and are inseparable from, sexuality and gender. Walia provides very convincing 
arguments for the rationale of (and need for) alliances between (unauthorised) migrants and 
indigenous  peoples.  Further  elaboration  on  the  connection  between sexuality  and borders 
could also facilitate the building of solidarity between queers and (unauthorised) migrants, as 
well as between feminists and (unauthorised) migrants.
Walia writes:
One  major  tension  is  the  'model  minority'  syndrome,  in  which  certain  categories  of  successful 
immigrants are used as symbols to discipline ghettoised communities of colour, such as undocumented 
migrants. The ability of the state to determine who is worthy of citizenship creates barriers between 
some immigrants, who believe they have met this test of worthiness and are grateful for being accepted 
into the colonial nation, and others who are subverting the system in order to exert the right to reside in 
Canada (Walia 2010:82).
The parallel  when it  comes to  sexuality would be homonormativity  and homonationalism 
(Puar 2007:25-8). Puar argues that just as 'multiculturalism [in which the model minority is 
key] is the accomplice of the ascendancy of whiteness' (2007:27), homonormativity is the 
accomplice  of  heteronormativity  (2007:9),  and  both  strengthen  the  nation.  Paraphrasing 
Walia: 'certain categories of successful [LGBTQ-people] are used as symbols to discipline 
ghettoised communities of [queers], such as [homeless, racialised, HIV-positive queers]. The 
ability of the state to determine who is worthy of [becoming a full-fledged citizen of the 
nation] creates barriers between some [LGBTQ-people], who believe they have met this test 
of worthiness and are grateful for being accepted into the [hetero/homonormative] nation, and 
others  who  are  subverting  the  system'.  Or,  expressed  in  Puar's  words:  'The  factioning, 
fractioning, and fractalizing of identity is a prime activity of societies of control, whereby 
subjects  (the  ethnic,  the  homonormative)  orient  themselves  as  subjects  through  their 
disassociation or  disidentification from others disenfranchised in  similar  ways in  favor  of 
consolidation  with  axes  of  privilege'  (2007:28).  Reading  Puar  through  Walia  could  also 
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constitute a call to use Puar's framework of affect and assemblage in a more thorough study of 
borders/regulated migration (which she does not discuss at any length), perhaps considering 
them – as well as the figure of 'the migrant' – as assemblages.
Changing  topic,  I  will  now  read  'the  freedom  to  stay'  alongside  a  feminist 
intersectional call to pay attention to people's very varying possibilities to move. De Genova 
(2010) or Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013) convey a lot of confidence in the transformative 
power of mobility – movement as 'an affective and generic gesture of freedom', a politics that 
'relies  on  struggles  for  movement  that  escape  and  subsequently  delegitimise  and  derail 
sovereign control'  (Papadopoulos & Tsianos (2013:185).  While I  agree with a lot  of their 
perspectives, I cannot help thinking that the subjects they imagine fit a little too comfortably 
alongside the traits that 21st Century capitalism demands of it subjects: the ability to survive 
without any institutional support, the flexibility to always adapt to changing conditions, the 
readiness to move to wherever one can find the means to support oneself (see for example 
White 2014:980-3; McRuer 2006). Attachments to places and people that make one unwilling 
to move, lacking the personal physical and psychological resources to be flexible and survive 
against  all  odds,  or  move despite  all  the  barriers,  all  this  has  no  place  in  the  neoliberal 
economy, and seems to be invisible also for many of those who foreground mobility as  the 
current transformative and revolutionary force. This matters not only for indigenous peoples, 
but for anyone who does not want to, or who is unable to, use mobility as the solution to their  
problems and as their method of transformative politics. It matters for the too old, the too 
young, the too ill, those who are so debilitated and vulnerable that they cannot move, those 
with people depending on them whom they can neither bring nor leave behind, those who 
love the place where they live too much and would not leave it for anything, the crip, and the  
poor, who cannot even imagine saving up enough money to move.
Attending to the freedom to stay may also provide a critique of postcolonial theory. 
Robert Young argues that 'indigenous activism uses a whole set of paradigms that do not fit 
easily with postcolonial presuppositions and theories – for example, ideas of the sacred and 
attachment to ancestral land. This disjunction, however, only illustrates the degree to which 
there has never been a unitary postcolonial theory – the right of return to sacred or ancestral 
land, for example, espoused by indigenous groups in Australia or the Palestine people, never 
fitted  easily  with  the  postmodern  Caribbean  celebration  of  delocalized  hybrid  identities' 
(Young  2012:24).  Attending  to  settler  colonialism,  displacement  and  forced  movement  – 
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which come into focus when starting from the position of indigenous peoples – shows that 
freedom of movement must be accompanied by the freedom to stay, and the possibility of 
maintaining  one's  livelihood  when  one  stays.  It  serves  as  a  reminder  not  to  locate  all 
transformative energy in 'mobility', but also in 'staying'.10
 Walia provides an extensive elaboration on how borders are racialising practices, but 
she does not elaborate on the racialised indifference to the death of thousands of migrants 
every year, people who die primarily when crossing the border, but also when already inside 
the country or as a consequence of deportation. Walia points towards the dehumanisation and 
indifference towards the suffering of migrants when she argues that '[t]heir [migrant workers] 
racial dehumanisation as “illegal” or “undesirable” (and, post-9/11, as “potential terrorists”) 
[...] legitimises their deplorable working conditions and the state securitisation processes that 
disproportionately  target  them'  (Walia  2010:79).  However,  turning  to  Mbembe  and  his 
concept 'necropolitics', we get an explicit theorisation of death as an objective as well as the 
indifference towards it.  By attending to  neo/colonialism Mbembe asks, '[i]s  the notion of 
biopower sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under the 
guise of war, of resistance, or of the fight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its 
primary and absolute objective?' (Mbembe 2003:12). It only takes a short step to add the 
militarisation of borders to that list.  Thousands die every year on their way from Asia or 
Africa to the EU (and on other migration routes), either at the direct hand of border patrols, or 
because the closure of ever more sections of the border forces migrants to take increasingly 
dangerous routes. The indifference towards what is going on, the lingering thought that it 
plays its part in reducing the number of migrants who come to Europe, a goal that is part of 
many European leaders's rhetoric,  as well as the way in which the death and suffering of 
(racialised) migrants is mobilised in the project of 'deterring' future migrants from embarking 
on the journey, all point to the relevance of seeing regulated migration as a necropolitical, in 
addition  to  a  biopolitical  practice.11 This  indifference  towards  killing  and  death,  argues 
Mbembe, rests on a 'racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native' 
(2003:24), or to use words applicable to the context of migration control rather than that of 
colonial occupation, the 'racial denial of any common bond' between, on the one hand, people 
10 See also Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002:326-7 about the need not to overemphasise fluidity in the attempt to 
counter the sedentary bias of statist-thinking such as methodological nationalism; and Cockburn 2014:438-9 
on land and on the 'right of return'.
11 Regulated migration as biopolitics is discussed in for instance Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012 and 
Vaughan-Williams 2010.
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and states of the Global North and on the other, migrants from the Global South whose life or 
death is not seen to matter, or is seen as 'not our problem'. As Butler (in Puar et al. 2012:170) 
argues, dominant norms – such as racialisation – shape 'whose life is grievable and worth 
protecting, and whose life is ungrievable, or marginally or episodically grievable – a life that 
is,  in  a  sense,  already  lost  in  part  or  in  whole  and  thus  less  worthy  of  protection  and 
sustenance'.
In summary, the main strengths of Walia's arguments and strategies are her recognition 
of the racialising function of borders, of the need for alliances (particularly between migrants 
and indigenous peoples), of the importance to struggle both for the freedom of movement and 
for the freedom to stay, as well as of the immediate need of most unauthorised migrants and 
residents to secure their legal status, and thus her questioning of the strict dualism between 
reformist and revolutionary strategies. Furthermore, this last point can be made theoretically 
by drawing on Butler, Berlant and Barad. Walia's arguments can also be further developed by 
combining them with Puar's arguments about the entanglements of racialisation, sexuality and 
the nation, and through Mbembe's and Butler's arguments about the dehumanising – and thus 
deadly – consequences of racialisation.
Borders as moulds and the community of value: Alliances, deservingness, 
'the migrant' and interdependency
My analysis of Anderson's arguments will focus on three topics: the ways in which Anderson's 
arguments  might  inspire  the  building  of  alliances  across  seemingly  disparate  groups;  her 
critique of deservingness; and the concept, category and figure of 'the migrant'. This last topic, 
'the migrant' as figure and concept, is in turn divided into three parts. Firstly, I discuss the 
intertwining  of  the  imagined  construct  of  'the  migrant'  –  and  even  more  so,  the  'illegal' 
migrant – with other power structures such as race, class, sexuality and gender. Secondly, I 
discuss the ways in which the concept of 'the migrant' may fix this category and those so 
labelled into subordination. Lastly, I focus on Anderson's argument that 'the migrant' is, both 
discursively and materially (or discursively-materially), a relational term to 'citizen', that they 
are interdependent. I then read this together with feminist discussions about interdependency 
and care as bases of organising social and political relations.
One  of  the  useful  points  that  Anderson  provides  to  the  practical  struggle  against 
borders  and  regulated  migration  is  her  argument  that  'contingent  acceptance'  into  the 
community  of  value  turns  different  contingently  accepted  groups  against  each  other.  The 
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community of value and its multiple bases of exclusion thus become a form of divide-and-rule  
practice. Recognising the structural similarity between seemingly disparate positions – the 
benefit claimant, the criminal, the non-citizen – can thus become a basis of solidarity and 
coalition-building,  rather  than  the  all-too-frequent  phenomenon  of  turning  these  groups 
against one another.
The  contours  of  the  community  of  value  are  permeable.  It  is  easy  to  move  from 
accepted to marginal to excluded. Anderson explains:
That is, as well as Good, non-, and Failed Citizens, there are also (not-quite-)good-enough citizens. 
These are 'tolerated citizens'. The fragility of hold of the Tolerated Citizen, the contingently accepted, 
permeates the politics of citizenship.  Those at risk of failure or of not belonging seek to dissociate 
themselves,  one  from  another.  Migrants  and  their  supporters  are  usually  eager  to  differentiate 
themselves from failed citizens with whom they are often associated. Assertions that refugees are not 
criminals, or that migrants do not claim benefits, are attempts to counter these associations by affirming 
the community of value. Migrants and refugees are fit to belong because they have the right kinds of 
values,  unlike  criminals  and  benefit  scroungers.  Similarly,  citizens  at  risk  of  failure  may  seek  to 
dissociate themselves from non-citizens in order to bolster their claim to rights (Anderson 2013:6).
Thus, '[c]ontingent acceptance turns tolerated citizens, who must often struggle for acceptance
into the community of value, into the guardians of good citizenship' (2013:6). This points to 
the shared interest of migrants, the poor, the working class, the racialised, the queer, those 
who challenge the 'proper' doing of gender, sexuality and family: to resist this divide-and-rule 
practice and instead challenge the community of value, and with it, regulated migration.
Secondly, I turn to the concept of deservingness, which I also discussed in the section 
about  citizenship. As  previously  discussed,  contribution  is  often  one  condition  for 
deservingness. Another condition of deserving assistance is that the reasons for necessitating 
it should be outside of one's control, and should not be the result of carelessness or lack of 
values. Anderson argues that it is easy to slide from 'deserving' benefit claimant to 'benefit 
scrounger'. She quotes UK Prime Minister David Cameron: 
We are finding a large number of people who are on incapacity benefits because of drug problems,  
alcohol problems or problems with weight and diet and I think a lot of people who pay their taxes 
and work hard will think, 'That's not what I pay my taxes for. I pay taxes for people who were  
incapacitated through no fault of their own' (Daily Mail 2011, in Anderson 2013:5).
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Proper 'values', which manifest in 'responsible' behaviour and self-mastery, is thus a common 
criteria for deservingness. Anderson argues that '[l]ack of values and value is the hallmark of 
the undeserving poor, […] the non-citizen and the Failed Citizen are both categories of the 
undeserving poor: one global, the other national'  (2013:5), it may be  'vagrants' (control of 
whom has been part  of legislation since the 14th Century in England),  contemporary poor 
'illegal'  migrants,  or  'benefit  scroungers'.  And  what  is  seen  as  'values'  and  proper  or 
responsible  behaviour  is  always  classed,  gendered,  sexualised,  racialised,  etc.  (see  for 
example  Anderson  2013;  Skeggs  2003;  Warner  2000).  An  example  of  deservingness  as 
dependent on responsible behaviour can be found in recent Swedish debate over health care 
and education for unauthorised residents. A common argument for granting these rights to 
children was that they are 'victims of their parents' choices' (that is, it is not their fault that  
they do not have legal status), whereas it was common to argue against these entitlements 
when it came to adults because, it was claimed, they had chosen to stay illegally, so it was 
their own fault they were in such a precarious situation (Hellgren 2014:1179-80).
Deservingness as conditional and dependent on contributions, values and behaviour, 
runs contrary to the dictum 'from each according to his [sic] ability, to each according to his  
[sic] needs'. It is clear that the decision over who is deserving is always dependent on power 
structures  associated,  at  least,  with  class,  race,  gender,  sexuality,  ability  and  nationality. 
Anderson systematically argues against any conditionality on deservingness or on the freedom 
of movement. This is one of the reasons that migration control must be abolished, because it  
will always differentiate between people, some as deserving and some as not. However, I read 
her as arguing that if it is not possible to abolish migration control completely and at once, if  
reform must come in steps and stages, then we should always seek that form of regularisation 
or reform that has as few conditions attached to it as possible.
Moving on I now turn to the third topic: the figure, term and concept of 'the migrant'. 
Anderson argues that 'migrant' is an othering term, the other of citizen (Anderson 2013:4), a 
term  that  is  classed  and  racialised,  which  involves  particular  figurations  of  gender  and 
sexuality. The idea of 'the migrant' does not correspond to those who are classified as migrants  
in legal and technical terms (Anderson 2013; Blinder 2015)12. Anderson et al. argue that only 
12 In the statistics of many countries nationals/citizens returning from an extended stay abroad count as 
'immigrants', serving as an example of how the term 'immigrant' means much more than a legal status, since 
citizens returning to their country of origin are not generally those imagined in public debates on migration 
(Blinder 2015:85)
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some  people  are  imagined  as  migrants,  '[t]he  figure  is  generally  negatively  gendered, 
racialized, and classed: US financiers, Australian backpackers, and British “expats” are not, 
generally, constructed as migrants' (Anderson et al. 2009:10), and the term 'illegal migrant' is 
even more heavily racialised, gendered, and classed. White rich tourists who overstay their 
tourist  visa,  international  students  who  work  more  than  their  student  visa  permits,  or 
academics going to international conferences and saying 'tourism' rather than 'employment' 
when asked about the purpose of their trip by the border agencies at the airport, none of these 
are commonly imagined as (semi) 'illegal migrants'. Villegas argues
In terms of race, im/migrants are often constructed as racialized outsiders […] Similarly, racialized 
peoples  are  often  categorized  as  im/migrants  […]  This  double  process  of  hierarchization  is 
augmented when it comes to precarious status migrants because of their association as 'fraudulent,' 
'bogus,' 'jumping the queue' […] and other modes of representing membership through formal status 
and perceptions of deservingness […] There is also a class component. Dauvergne (2008) alludes to 
the interlocking between discourses of race, class and immigration status when she states: '[w]hile  
any number of people may infringe migration laws and regulations, the label adheres better to some 
than to others. We imagine illegals as poor and brown and destitute' (Villegas 2015:186).
This  is  revealing  of  the  entanglement  of  borders,  migration  control  and  citizenship  with 
various power structures such as race and class, and thus, as discussed in previous sections 
(for example in that on De Genova), of how migration controls targets people differently and 
produce people differently.
However, it points to something else too. Here I turn to the second aspect of 'the 
migrant': this term may fix the subordination of those so labelled. Since the term migrant is 
already imbued with power structures that fixes it  as an 'other',  not just  along the line of 
citizen versus non-citizen, but also along racial, gender, sexual and class terms, the use of the 
term and the figure of the migrant – for example in 'migrant justice' – is always at risk of 
contributing to the fixation of these subordinations rather than to their dissolution. This is a 
parallel  argument to that  which claims that we must  look at,  and question,  how different 
categories are created, since the category itself might facilitate the subordination.  The term 
'migrant' fills the purpose of legitimising the restriction of movement of those so classified, 
'foreigners'  in  contrast  to  'citizens',  whose  movement  cannot  legitimately  be  restricted 
(Anderson et al. 2009).  This argument rests on a view of categories and terms as relational, 
and particularly, on the recognition that this relation is hierarchical. The meaning of each term 
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is  dependant  on  its  (dominant  or  subordinate)  position  in  this  dichotomy.  Butler  (2010) 
questions, for example, if it is really viable to use 'woman' as the object of feminist struggle,  
or if doing so will not just fix the subordination of 'women'.
The awkwardness, limitations, inadequacy and fixing character of the term 'migrant' 
may also be felt in practice. As Rygiel (2011:13) argues, 'the use of the term “migrant” itself 
can invoke a certain distancing that becomes offensive through social relations', and that 'the 
very  label  “migrant”  comes  to  be  seen  as  “offensive”  in  its  “non-specificity”'  (2011:15). 
Anderson argues that we need 'a new perspective on migration, one that does not essentialize 
(and thereby recreate) the figure of the Migrant' (2013:179). There are several reasons why 
this is needed. Apart from the 'othering', fixing, and subordinating function of 'migrant' as an 
unquestioned term, discussed above, taking the term 'migrant' for granted also obscures the 
fact that it is produced by the border, 'without borders there could be no “migrants”, only 
mobility' (De Genova referred to in White 2014:993). It also obscures the relational nature of 
the  term,  functioning  as  the  'other'  of  'citizen'.  Here  we come to  the  third  aspect  of  the 
consideration of the term 'migrant', namely interdependency.
Anderson argues, '[t]he wealth of the kingdom is not independent of the poverty of 
the woodcutter', 'the kingdom' here is the receiving state and 'the woodcutter' is the migrant, 
'impoverished because the kingdom had chopped the forest down to satisfy its requirement for 
fuel' (Anderson 2013:177). Some of the underlying causes of migration today are indeed a 
result of the centuries-long – and continuing – exploitation, destruction and subordination of 
the  Global  South  by  the  Global  North.  The  primary  term in  the  dichotomy,  'citizen',  is 
(discursively)  dependant  the  secondary,  subordinate  term  'migrant'  –  'the  ontologically 
valorized  term A actually  depends for  its  meaning on the  simultaneous subsumption  and 
exclusion of term B' (Sedgwick 2008:9-10) – and 'citizens' are also very materially dependant 
on  'migrants',  both  on  the  making  of  migrants  (the  exploitation  that  undermines  people's 
means of subsistence and forces them to migrate) and on the labour of 'migrants' (who are 
employed, for example, in production and care work).
Butler  speaks  of  our  ontological  interdependency.  To  become  subjects  we  are 
fundamentally dependent on a dyadic exchange in which we are interpellated and recognised 
by an other (2005:23-4). A focus on interdependency and care as possible bases for ethics and 
social relations have also been espoused by other feminist  thinkers.  For example,  Berlant 
argues that we need to 
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[r]einvent work and care […] to change the affective resonance about dependency. In neoliberal 
normativity, to be dependent is to be non-sovereign: but in the era of austerity, it is the first step to  
solidarity (Berlant in McCabe 201113)
and that
[t]hinking about what it means to see relations of care as the source for new social relations that 
would have policy implications is a really great development in LGBTQ politics from all sorts of  
perspectives.  But I  think that  has  to be accompanied by different  kinds of  cultural  activity  and 
different forms of fantasy about what it means to understand collective life as a problem of survival  
(Berlant in Seitz 2013).
Anderson seems to be on the same path:
beginning, not with a job, but with the need for subsistence, not with a  spouse, but with the need for  
mutual care and support, and not with the right to exclude, but with the assumption of people's full  
inclusion,  has  the  potential  to  open  up  politics  and  analysis.  It  invites  an  open,  complex,  and 
multifaceted contemporary 'us' that has the possibility of being shaped by shared imagined futures as  
well as shared imagined pasts (Anderson 2013:180-1, my italics).
However,  while  there  is  a  lot  of  potential  in  turning  to  interdependency  and  care  as  an 
alternative way of organising our social relations and in thinking about community, there are 
also a number of potential problems and risks. Firstly, interdependency and dependency do 
not affect everyone equally. At an ontological level we are all interdependent, just as we are 
all  precarious, but dependency is  just  as unevenly created and distributed as material  and 
social precarity. Butler (as cited above at the end of my analysis of Walia) argues that there is 
an 'unequal distribution of precarity, one that depends upon dominant norms regarding whose 
life is grievable and worth protecting, and whose life is ungrievable' (Butler in Puar et al. 
2012:170).
Secondly,  focusing  on  interdependency  risks  paying  less  attention  to  power 
relations.  Berlant  argues:  '[p]recarious  politics  also  signified  a  shift  (that  I'm  genuinely 
ambivalent about) from an idiom of power to an idiom of care as ground for what needs to  
change to better suture the social' (in Puar et al. 2012:166), and the same could be said about  
13 This source has no page numbers.
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focusing on interdependency. This does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to combine 
an ethics of interdependency and care with a focus on power, but it might require making an 
extra effort.
Thirdly, we have to make sure that 'care' as an empty signifier is not appropriated 
by, for example, racist discourses. Diana Mulinari and Anders Neergaard (2014:53) elaborate 
on  the  concept  'caring  racism'  by  showing  how  some  women  activists  in  the  Sweden 
Democrats argue that they want less immigration because they 'care for others', and thus how 
'care' can be seen 'as a floating signifier successfully appropriated by the racist party'. They 
argue  that  the  normative  'good'  in  care  has  often  been  taken  for  granted  in  feminist 
scholarship,  but  that  through  identifying  a  colonial,  or  contemporary  racist  discourse  of 
caring,  they show that  a  care  discourse can enable  'colonisers  to  construct  themselves as 
superior' and that it can be used to legitimise relations of power (2014:53). A central problem 
here is thus who decides what 'care' is: the definition must be determined by those who are the 
objects of care. As Anderson (2013:180) argues, '[i]f they [migrants] choose to be exploited 
from a universe of admittedly constrained options, then this choice should be theirs to make'.  
It is not an option to restrict immigration with the argument that this would protect migrants. 
Anderson (2013:180) continues, '[t]he argument goes that those who are more economically 
privileged  should  be  careful  about  claiming  to  protect  those  in  more  constrained 
circumstances from risks by further limiting their options'.
All  these  things  have  to  be  taken  into  account  if,  or  when,  we  pursue 
interdependency and care as bases of social and political relations. Furthermore,  an ethics 
based on interdependency or care could be more useful when it comes to thinking about, or 
trying to enlarge, the sphere of our ethical responsibility, than in determining the exact content 
of ethical conduct. Perhaps discourses of care can prove useful in establishing that there is a 
relation that has to be acknowledged, as a strategy against dehumanisation, indifference and 
individuation.  This may also be  linked to  Butler's  suggestion that  'the  norms that  govern 
ethical principles must be understood as operating not only to guide conduct but to decide the 
question of who and what will be a human subject' (Butler 2005:109-110).
In  short,  there  are  several  useful  aspects  of  Anderson's  arguments.  By  paying 
attention to 'values' Anderson discusses the entanglement of various power structures and how 
these underpin the logic of migration control and delimitation of the community of value. This  
points  to  the  structural  similarity  between  different  positions  or  figures,  such  as  'illegal 
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migrants' and 'benefit scroungers'. Recognising this might lead to a more thorough critique of 
current  politics and its  delimitation of community,  as well  as  to  the building of  alliances 
between  seemingly  disparate  positions.  Her  consideration  of  value  and  values  further 
contributes to  a  critique of basing the freedom of  movement and other entitlements  on a 
differentiation  between  some  people  as  deserving  and  other  as  undeserving.  Lastly,  a 
consideration of the figure and term 'migrant' shows that it is from the start enmeshed with 
other power relations, which is indicative of how regulated migration is entangled with, for 
instance,  race,  gender,  sexuality,  class,  etc.,  and  that  further,  since  'migrant'  is  already  a 
subordinated term it might sometimes fix subordination rather than dissolve it. The discursive 
and material  interdependency of 'migrant'  and 'citizen',  also points towards wider feminist 
discussions about the strengths and risks of a politics based on interdependency and care.
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Conclusion
Recognizing the illegitimacy of regulated migration and all the problems that it causes, I have 
in this thesis sought to find strong arguments and strategies against borders and regulated 
migration. I aimed to find effective arguments and strategies for the practical struggle against 
regulated migration, carried out by unauthorised migrants themselves and by people working 
to support them, and arguments that could form a foundation for future feminist research on 
borders and regulated migration and the struggles against these institutions. I have explored 
different arguments (and the strategies they imply or spell out) by reading them through the 
context of practical work against regulated migration and through feminist theory, particularly 
through intersectionality and through the work by Berlant, Puar and Butler.
Based on the practical situation of unauthorised migrants/residents, for whom the 
attainment of residence permit is crucial for their immediate well-being, I have come to the 
conclusion that strategies – even if  they are,  in principle,  against the right  of the state to 
decide on migration – must  sometimes engage with  the state  and try to  obtain residence 
permits for those who do not have it, and in order to strengthen social rights for unauthorised 
residents. This interaction with the state must, however, always keep in mind the fundamental  
vision of everyone's entitlement to the freedom of movement and freedom to stay. It should be 
a strategic interaction that avoids reproducing the logic of some being more deserving that 
others. The strategic interaction must also, through the interaction, seek to change the state 
and undermine its right to regulate mobility. The impossibility of maintaining a principled 
refusal to engage with the state becomes apparent when considering people's very varying 
abilities to cope with deportability and the far-reaching power that the migration regime has 
over their lives. This strategy or tactic can also be theoretically elaborated and supported if we 
see objects such as the state and borders not as coherent, clearly definable and stable 'things', 
but as patternings of practices and projections,  as Berlant argues. In this way, it  becomes 
possible to change these objects through engagement/intra-action. Thus, we can establish a 
more  theoretical  elaboration  of  Walia's  argument  that  there  is  no  strict  dualism between 
reformist and revolutionary strategies (2013:182-7).
Further, strategies and arguments should strive to create imaginaries and practices 
that support a better world. Our internal practices must of course be anti-racist and feminist,  
but we can also practice a better  world on a somewhat larger scale,  for example through 
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creating  sanctuary  cities  and  local  citizenship  policies,  which  provide  examples  of  the 
viability of alternative imaginaries.
Strategies  and  arguments  should  make  sure  to  avoid  reproducing  norms  of 
deservingness,  for  example  by working for  reforms or  regularisation  programs that  leave 
some people behind.  This is  important  both for those who would fall  in  the  undeserving 
category and whose possibilities of staying would thus be undermined, and also because, as 
Anderson argues,  the norms underpinning migration  law also underpin deservingness and 
worth for citizens. For example, if labour is a condition, what does that do for those – citizens 
and migrants  – who are unable to work? Instead,  strong arguments should start  from the 
position of the fundamental  freedom of movement,  and freedom to stay,  that everyone is 
entitled to a liveable life, that we are fundamentally interdependent.
In  addition,  building  coalitions  and  alliances  is  often  strategically  important. 
Attending to how regulated migration and borders intra-act with multiple power structures, for 
example along the lines of class, race, gender, sexuality and ability, can facilitate the building 
of alliances by demonstrating the shared interests of the various groups.
Effective  arguments  against  borders  and  regulated  migration  see  borders  as 
productive: productive of subjects, relations, imaginaries and affects. Strong arguments must 
fully  take  into  account  the  extent  to  which  borders  are  entangled  with  multiple  power 
structures – for example race, class, gender, sexuality, nationality, ability – because without 
recognising these crucial  entanglements,  arguments fail to acknowledge the complexity of 
how borders and regulated migration work, and the many different things and subjects that 
they produce. Acknowledging the ways in which borders are entangled with multiple power 
structures  also  strengthens  the  case  against  regulated  migration  by  providing  several 
arguments against it. Furthermore, effective arguments take into account different migrants, 
contexts,  forms  of  migrations  and  reasons  to  migrate,  and  point  to  their  commonalities 
without erasing their differences. Strong arguments must never pitch different groups against 
each other, but they must also not erase the differences between their positions.
Further, arguments improve when they recognise that their objects – in this case the 
state,  sovereignty,  borders  or  citizenship  –  are  not  static,  given,  clear-cut  'things',  but 
patternings, practices, processes and projections. This is important primarily for two reasons. 
Firstly, it  creates arguments that are compatible with the strategic impossibility of always 
refusing  to  engage with  institutions/objects  that  we oppose.  Secondly,  it  ensures  that  we 
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recognise the importance of imaginaries – of being able to imagine something better – but 
also the cruelty  (as  Berlant  puts  it)  of  maintaining attachments  to  objects  that undermine 
rather than facilitate  the realisation of the desires that we attach to them. Thinking about 
objects in this way makes it possible to think critically about what it is that the objects in our 
argument really do.
Borders and regulated migration must be studied further within feminism. Firstly, 
borders and regulated migration cause a lot of suffering and inequality, and if feminism is 
about solidarity, equality and protecting and defending those lives that are most precarious, 
most  marginalised and invisible,  then borders  and regulated migration must  be a  primary 
concern for feminism. Secondly, borders and regulated migration are key practices through 
which a whole range of power structures work. Attending to borders and regulated migration 
would thus be valuable for feminist work on many other issues. Lastly, as I have shown, 
feminist theory plays a crucial role in understanding borders and regulated migration and  in 
making effective arguments and strategies against them. Thus, feminist theory and practices 
are needed to advance this project.
In  short,  we need arguments and strategies  that  'challenge frontally  the right  of 
states to control their borders and territories, or the rights of states to exclude and deport'  
(Anderson et al. 2009:8), and we also need critical work that asks 'what is a good life? And 
how do we go about making institutions and imaginaries that support it?' (Berlant in Seitz 
2013).
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